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SUMMARY 
 
This treatise discusses the increasing of the procedural and substantive limitations 
on the employees’ right to strike.  The Constitution permits the right to strike to be 
limited in terms of the laws of general application.  The Labour Relations Act (LRA) is 
a good example.  Such limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society, based on human dignity, equality and freedom.  The study 
sought to investigate whether further increasing the existing limitations on the right to 
strike unduly breaches employees’ Constitutional right to strike and the purpose of 
the LRA.  Further, the study sought to find out whether the additional content 
requirements in the strike notice amount to importing into the LRA additional 
limitations on the fundamental right to strike that enjoys no textual support. 
 
Through an extensive literature review, the findings arguably show that indeed further 
increasing the limitations on the employees’ right to strike may unduly infringe their 
right to strike.  Moreover, the increase of the content requirements in a strike notice 
creates an unnecessary hurdle to employees wishing to strike. 
 
One of the most important finding made is that instead further increasing the 
limitations on the right to strike, going back to the basics of negotiation to alleviate 
strikes, particularly wage-related strikes is vital.  To achieve this, it is important for 
employers to re-establish social and individual relationships with their employees, 
whereby they become aware of the issues that employees face on a daily basis.  
Also, establishing proper workplace dialogue and forums would assist employers in 
becoming aware of employees concerns.  This would thereby prevent strikes, as 
problems can be dealt with beforehand.  The findings above informed in the 
recommendations at the end of the study. 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
The right to strike is the most visible form of collective industrial action that workers 
employ with a view to forcing employers to the bargaining table to agree to their 
demands.1 An employer’s task of planning to protect his business against an 
impeding strike2 just became a little more complicated.3 The sight of policemen 
brutally gunning down striking mineworkers at Marikana left the whole country 
appalled.  Since then, the rights of striking employees and the unions they belong to, 
have once again come to the spotlight.4  
 
It is worth noting from the onset is that the manner in which the Labour Relations Act5 
regulates strikes has remained practically unchanged since 1995.6 Instead of 
suggestion that allows employees to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed right 
to strike, the Labour Relations Amendment Bill7 only envisions to limit this right even 
further. In a similar reasoning the Department of Labour Deputy Director-General for 
labour policy and industrial relations Mr Kettledas, noted that the solution is not really 
amending the law, but rather in the proper implementation thereof.8 
 
                                                          
1  Van der Walt, Le Roux and Govindjee Labour Law in Context (2012) 203. See also Grogan 
Collective Labour Law (2010) 141. 
2  S 213 of the LRA defines strike as “the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the 
retardation or obstruction of work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same 
employer or by different employers, for the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a 
dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee, and every 
reference to "work" in this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or 
compulsory”. 
3  Maharaj and Stuart  “Strike notices: one for all or all for one?” 2012-10-08. 
http://www.golegal.co.za/courts/strike-notices-one-all-or-all-one-constitutional-court-settles-
vexed-question (Accessed on the 25-12-2014). 
4  De Vos  “Constitutionally Speaking: Sharp Divisions on the Constitutional Court about the right 
to strike.” 25 September 2012. http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/sharp-divisions-on-the-
constitutional-court-about-the-right-to-strike/  (Accessed on 12/01/2014).  
5  Act 66 of 1995. Hereinafter referred to as the LRA or the Act. 
6  Du Toit and Ronnie The Necessary Evolution of Strike Law (2012) 200. See also Benjamin A 
Review of Labour Markets in South Africa: Labour Market Regulation: International and South 
African Perspectives (2005) 36. 
7  Hereinafter referred to as the 2012 Bill. 
8  Kettledas “Changing SA’s Labour Law not the Answer” 2013 (2013-7-31) Mining Weekly News 
7 http://www.miningweekly.com/article/changing-sas-labour-law-not-the-answer-says-ddg-2013-
07-31.  
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South Africa is a member of the International Labour Organization (hereinafter the 
“ILO”). The Preamble to the ILO affirms that “whereas a universal and lasting peace 
can be established only if it is based upon social justice, and whereas conditions of 
labour exist involving injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as 
to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled”,9 
there can be no doubt that the right to strike is a very important instrument in the 
collective bargaining in order to ensure the economic right of workers. This therefore 
entails that a denial or undue limitation of this right would lead to a substantial 
weakening of the bargaining power of workers as they cannot equally match the 
strength of management in a case of an inevitable conflict of interests between the 
parties. 
 
In recognition of the important role of a right to strike, the ILO’s Committee on 
Freedom of Association maintains that “the right to strike is one of the essential 
means through which workers and their organizations may promote and defend their 
economic and social interests”.10 These interests which workers seek to defend 
through the exercising of the right to strike not only concern better working conditions 
or collective claims of an occupational nature, but they also seek solutions to 
economic and social-policy questions and problems facing the undertaking which is 
of direct concern to the workers.11  Kahn-Freund is of the view that it is through the 
exercise of the right to strike that workers attain more power to meet the needs of 
maintaining equilibrium in industrial relations.12 This treatise supports that strike is the 
                                                          
9  See Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organization of 1919. Available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/leg/download/constitution.pdf (Accessed on 23/2/2014). 
10  Committee on Freedom of Association, Digest, par 522. See also Grogan, (Labour Law/ 
Employment Law Journal/ 2013/ April/ Strike notices What must they contain?): Grogan 
indicates that employees use the right to strike as a weapon to prove to the employer that 
resisting to accepts their demands could be fatal and costly than acceding to them. See also 
FGWU v Minister of Safety & Security (1999) ILJ 1258 (LC) 1264 par 18 and CEPPWAWU v 
Metrofile (Pty) Ltd (2004) ILJ 231 (LAC) 246 par 53. See also Art 8 United Nations International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which recognizes the important role of a 
right to strike in support of economic and social interests, provided that it is exercised in 
conformity with the laws of the particular country, in this case South Africa. 
11  Committee on Freedom of Association, Digest, par 526. 
12  Kahn-Freud and Hepple Laws against Strikes (1972) 5. Also Grunfeld note “if one set of human 
beings is placed in a position of unchecked industrial authority over another set, to expect the 
former to keep the interest of the latter constantly in mind and, for example, to increase the 
latter’s earnings as soon as the surplus income is available…is to place on human nature a 
strain it was never designed to bear” 52.  See Grunfeld, Modern Trade Union Law (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1966) 33.  See also Davies and Friedland, in Khan - Freund's Labour and 
The Law 3rd ed (1983) 292. Advancing support to necessity of the right to strike in collective 
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most powerful instrument normally adopted by the employees in order to achieve 
their demands. 
 
The legality of the right to strike is derived from legislation, case law, international 
Conventions of the country, collective agreements and in some countries like South 
Africa, the Constitution. The ILO, particularly the Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention13 and the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention,14 are the two leading instruments of international 
protection of freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike. 
Although neither of these conventions expressly provides for a positive right to strike, 
the jurisprudence developed by the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations15 and the Committee on Freedom of 
Association16 respectively recognise the existence of the right to strike.17  
 
Expressing a similar view on the rationale for strikes, Servais notes that “the ILO 
organs of control have had numerous occasions to take a position on the subject and 
as a result, they have built up a body of principles recognizing that the right to strike 
constitutes an intrinsic corollary to the right to organize and a fundamental right of 
workers and of their organisations”.18 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
bargaining, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton further rationalised: “To protect such a right is not to 
approve or disapprove of its exercise in any particular withdrawal of labour, it is to recognise the 
fact that the limits set to the right to strike and to lockout are one measure of the strength which 
each party can in the last resort bring to bear at the bargaining table. The strength of a union is 
bound to be related to its power and its right to call out its members, so long as any semblance 
of collective bargaining survives.” See Wedderburn The Worker and the Law (1986), 245.  
13  Convention No 87 of 1948. 
14  Convention No 98 of 1949. 
15  Hereinafter referred to as “the CEACR”. 
16  Hereinafter referred to as “the CFA”. 
17   Creighton and Stewart, Labour Law (2005) 4th ed 533 and Gernigon, Odero and Guido, ILO 
Principles concerning the Right to Strike International Labour Office, Geneva, 2000.  The CFA 
was established in 1951. After a relatively slow beginning, the number of cases submitted to the 
CFA increased steadily for a number of years. Overall, the Committee has examined more than 
2400 alleged breaches of the principles of freedom of association. It has also established an 
elaborate jurisprudence, the key features of which are set out in the ILO’s Digest of decisions. It 
does not concern “case law” in the strict sense of the word: The examination of periodic reports 
on Conventions Nos 87 and 98 also constitutes an important part of the work of the CEACR. 
For example, in 2007, the Committee addressed “observations” to 103 of the 147 States that 
had ratified Convention No 87, plus direct requests to 55 States (including 30 that had also 
received an observation). 
18  Servais “The ILO law and the freedom to strike” Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions 
and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO 
Geneva, International Labour Office, 5th ed (revised) (2006) par 523. 
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South Africa emerges from a history where workers, and in particular African 
workers, did not enjoy a right to strike without consequences. However, following the 
advent of the Constitution, the right to strike is now guaranteed to every worker and 
indeed enjoys a high degree of protection in the South African Constitution.19 In fact, 
the Constitutional Court has affirmed in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v 
Bader Bop20 that this right is essential for the dignity of workers who in our 
constitutional dispensation may not be treated as coerced employees. In addition, the 
court acknowledges that it is by means of strike that workers are able to assert 
bargaining power in industrial relations.21 Du Toit opines that there can be no 
equilibrium in industrial relations without the freedom to strike.22 
 
Post 1994, South Africa adopted various new forms of labour legislation, including 
the LRA. The LRA gives form and content to the right to strike in the Constitution by 
establishing substantive and procedural requirements. Similarly, it establishes a set 
of limitations23 imposed on a party wishing to participate in a strike in order for a 
                                                          
19  S 23(2)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Hereinafter referred to as 
the Constitution. Chapter 2 Bill of Rights in the Constitution particularly s 23(2)(c) recognises the 
right to strike which is guaranteed to every worker. See also Du Plessis and Fouche Practical 
Guide to Labour Law (2007) 355. See also Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa (1996) 4 SA 744 (CC). 
20  (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC). 
21  Ibid. 
22  Du Toit, Woolfrey, Murphy, Godfrey, Bosch and Christie Labour Relations Law (1999) 236 237. 
See also Davies and Friedland, in Khan-Freund's Labour and The Law (1983) 292. Advancing 
support to necessity of the right to strike in collective bargaining, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton 
further rationalised: “To protect such a right is not to approve or disapprove of its exercise in any 
particular withdrawal of labour, it is to recognise the fact that the limits set to the right to strike 
and to lockout are one measure of the strength which each party can in the last resort bring to 
bear at the bargaining table. The strength of a union is bound to be related to its power and its 
right to call out its members, so long as any semblance of collective bargaining survives.” See 
Wedderburn The Worker and the Law (1986) 245. 
23  S 65 sets out the limitations on right to strike or recourse to lock-out and provides as follows: 
 (1)  No person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or in any conduct in contemplation or 
furtherance of a strike or a lock-out if- 
(a) that person is bound by a collective agreement that prohibits a strike or lock-out in 
respect of the issue in dispute; 
(b)  that person is bound by an agreement that requires the issue in dispute to be 
referred to arbitration; 
(c)  the issue in dispute is one that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or to the 
Labour Court in terms of this Act; 
(d)  that person is engaged in- 
(i)  an essential service; or 
(ii)  a maintenance service. 
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strike to be considered as protected. In the same way, the ILO recognises that the 
right to strike is not absolute and may therefore be curtailed in relation to 
circumstances, participants, object and procedure.24 
 
It is commonly accepted that for employees or unions to exercise this right, it must be 
preceded by certain generally acceptable procedural requirements spelt out in the 
Act. However, the Committee on Freedom of Association warns that such 
requirements should be reasonable and must not in any event cause substantial 
limitations on the means of action open to trade-union organizations.25  Equally, in 
the case of SATAWU v Moloto,26 the Constitutional Court emphasized that:  
 
“The right to strike is protected as a fundamental right in the Constitution without 
any express limitation. The constitutional rights conferred without express 
limitation should not be cut down by reading implicit limitations into them, and 
when legislative provisions limit or intrude upon those rights they should be 
interpreted in a manner least restrictive of the right if the text is reasonably 
capable of bearing that meaning.”27 
 
Currently, the LRA provides three procedural requirements which must be satisfied 
by a trade union who wishes to embark on protected-strike action. The first 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2) (a) Despite s 65(l)(c), a person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or in any conduct 
in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike or lockout if the issue in dispute is 
about any matter dealt with in ss 12 to 15  (organisational rights.) 
(b)  If the registered trade union has given notice of the proposed strike in terms of 
section 64(l) in respect of an issue in dispute referred to in paragraph (a), it may 
not exercise the right to refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of section 21 for a 
period of 12 months from the date of the notice. 
(3)  Subject to a collective agreement, no person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or in 
any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike or lock-out- 
(a)  if that person is bound by- 
(i)  any arbitration award or collective agreement that regulates the issue in 
dispute; or 
(ii)  any determination made in terms of s 44 by the Minister that regulates the 
issue in dispute; or 
(b)  any determination made in terms of the Wage Act and that regulates the issue in 
dispute, during the first year of that determination. 
24  Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No 87), 
Article 3; General Survey on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 151. See also 
International Labour Office, Labour legislation guidelines, Ch 5: Substantive provisions of labour 
legislation the right to strike, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/llg/index.htm 
(Accessed 29 July 2014). 
25  1996d. Freedom of association: Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of 
Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO 4th ed (revised). Geneva par 498). 
Hereinafter referred to as the ILO, 1996d. 
26  (2012) 33 ILJ 2549 (CC). 
27  Par 44. 
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procedural requirement is compulsory and requires that the issue in dispute be 
referred to the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration28 for a 
conciliation meeting between the parties concerned. The courts have maintained that 
if the dispute is not referred to the CCMA, or bargaining council as the case may be, 
the strike is unprotected.29 The main reason for conciliation is an attempt to resolve 
the dispute at the initial stage with the help of an appointed commissioner who 
facilitate the negotiation. If the dispute is settled at conciliation, strike action is 
averted.  
 
However, if conciliation is unsuccessful or 30 days period has lapsed from date on 
which the dispute was referred to the council or the CCMA for conciliation, the 
Commissioner would subsequently issue a certificate stating that the issue in dispute 
remains unresolved.30 It is the acquisition of this certificate which forms the second 
procedural requirement of protected strike action in terms of the Act. Thirdly, any 
employee and/ or union who, after the issuing of a certificate by the Commissioner, 
wish to go out on strike must give an employer at least 48 hours’ notice in advance of 
the intended strike action or a 7 days’ notice if the employer is the State31 unless the 
court allows for a shorter period.32  
 
Grogan notes that it is sufficient for a notice to be given to a bargaining council if the 
employer is bound by agreements of such council and the dispute relates to a 
collective agreement concluded in the council.33 In terms of the LRA, such notice 
must be in writing.34 This implies therefore that a strike notice made verbally may 
render the strike to be unprotected. As the law currently stand, as long as these three 
procedural requirements are fulfilled, the strike would be deemed to be protected. 
                                                          
28  Hereinafter referred to as the CCMA. 
29  BP Southern African (Pty) ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Others (1998) 3 LLD 317; 
Pick ‘n Pay v SA Commercial Catering & Allied Union & Others (1998) 19 ILJ 1546 (LC.)  
30  Maritime Industries Trade Union of SA & Others v Transnet Ltd & Others (2002) 23 ILJ 2213 
(LAC); Gillet Exhaust Technology (Pty) Ltd t/a Tenneco v National Union of Metalworkers of SA 
on behalf of Members & another (2010) 31 ILJ 2552 (LAC).  See also Grogan Collective Labour 
Law (2007) 136. 
31  S 64(1)(b) of the Act. 
32  Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 25. See also Chris Todd Collective 
Bargaining Law (2004) 60 61; Gillet Exhaust Technology (Pty) Ltd t/a Tenneco v National Union 
of Metalworkers of SA on behalf of Members & another (2010) 31 ILJ 2552 (LAC). 
33  Grogan Workplace Law (2007) 384. 
34  S 64(1)(c) of the LRA. 
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This view is also accepted and supported by the Committee on Freedom of 
Association.35 Grogan observes that these procedural requirements are meant to 
ensure that strikes are not used as a first resort.36 
 
As mentioned above, section 65 of the LRA sets out the limitations imposed on a 
party wishing to participate in a strike. The Bill, while maintaining the above three 
requirements, proposes the insertion of a further procedural requirement.37 The 
proposed amendment to this section, particularly the provisions dealing with 
procedural limitations, has triggered great concern among trade unions.  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Understandably, the amendments in the Bill are intended to respond to unacceptable 
levels of unprotected industrial action and unlawful acts in support of industrial action, 
including violence and intimidation.38 It needs to be stressed that these additional 
limitations to the traditional prerequisites merit further study. This is because, if 
employees could not, in the last resort, collectively refuse to work, they could not 
bargain collectively.39 In fact, in the absence of a right to strike “collective bargaining” 
would only amount to “collective begging”.40  The amendments to the current LRA 
are undoubtedly imminent.  Certainly, their adoption will contain principles that seek 
to severely restrict and limit the constitutional right to strike. 
 
It is with particular interest that this treatise seeks to acquire more insight into these 
amendments specifically the extension of the limits on procedural and substantive 
requirements before employees could embark on a strike.  Maserumule has 
observed that the LRA, rather than positively implementing the constitutional right to 
                                                          
35  ILO, 1996d, par 500 – 510. 
36  Grogan Labour Law/ Employment Law Journal/ 2013/ April/ “Strike notices What must they 
contain?” (Accessed on 20/2/2014). 
37  The South African Labour Guide “New amendments on the Labour Relations Act and the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act” available at http://www.labourguide.co.za/most-recent-
publications/new-amendements-on-the-labour-relations-act-and-the-basic-conditions-of-
employment-act. (Accessed on 26 January 2013). 
38  Ibid. 
39  Kahn-Freud Labour and the Law (1983) 292. See also John Brand Strike Avoidance – How to 
Develop an Effective Strike Avoidance Strategy Paper presented at the 23rd Annual Labour Law 
Conference, (August 2010) 7. http://www.lexisnexis.co.za/pdf/Workshop_3_3_Strike 
_Avoidance_presented_by_John_Brand.pdf (Accessed on 26-4-2014). 
40  Ibid. 
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strike, serves to limit it and that the courts have, similarly, failed to protect the right to 
strike and have instead been “preoccupied with giving effect to the limitation of this 
right”.41  In S v Zuma42 and also in Numsa v Bader Bop43 the court emphasized that 
the right to strike should not be limited unduly, in fact this right should be limited as 
little as possible. Ben-Israel likewise confirms this assertion by emphasizing that 
restrictions on the right to strike are acceptable as long as they do not place 
substantial limitations on the means of action open to trade-union organisations.44 
 
In an article written by Du Toit on the future of collective bargaining and labour law in 
South Africa,45 employees who were interviewed therein following the 2007 strike 
action argued that they were not ignorant to the importance of labour legislation. 
Actually they portrayed a mindset cognisant of the limitations of the authority of the 
law when confronted with the importance of strike action. One worker was quoted 
saying that, 
 
“I do not think the law is wrong as such. Law is supposed to defend the right to 
strike and the rights of those not on strike. But how can we follow that law? 
Thina, how are we going to be successful in winning our demands? We can’t 
always be upright. Umthetho oyaphulwa, oyenzelwe oko phulwa (‘Laws were 
made to be broken’). We must follow the majority. The majority vote for a strike. 
We must find ways to make those others join the strike and the decision of the 
majority. You are working, we are on strike. You must be afraid for your 
safety.”46 
 
1.3  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The underlying theme for this study is that the right to strike should not be limited 
unduly. The primary aim of the study is to critically analyse the increasing of the 
procedural limitation on the constitutional right to strike. The treatise also aims to 
analyse and discuss the legal framework relating to strike notice and ballot 
requirement in order for a strike to be regarded as protected. In doing so, an in-depth 
                                                          
41  Maserumule “A Perspective on Developments in Strike Law” 2001 22 ILJ 45 46. 
42  (1995) 2 SA 642 (CC). 
43  (2005) 2 BCLR 182 (CC). See also Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Plascon Decorative 
(Inland) (Pty) Ltd 1990 ILJ 321 (LAC); Business South Africa v The Congress of South African 
Trade Unions [1997] 6 BLLR 681 (LAC). 
44  Ben-Israel International Labour Standards (1998) 118. 
45  Du Toit “What is the future of collective bargaining and labour law in South Africa?” (2007) 28 
ILJ 1405 1423.   
46  Von Holdt “Institutionalisation, Strike Violence and Local Moral Orders Transformation:  Critical 
Perspectives on Southern Africa” 2010 72/73 Peer reviewed journals 142. 
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understanding of the meaning, purpose and content of a notice of strike as envisaged 
by the ILO,47 and how this is translated in a South African context will be 
investigated.  
 
1.4  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
With this intention in mind this study investigates the following questions to find out 
whether the proposed limitations are perhaps capable of meeting their stated 
objectives or whether they are inconsistent with the Constitution.  
 
1) Do these additional procedural requirements not only amount to importing into 
the LRA additional limitations on the fundamental right to strike that enjoy no 
textual support?  
2) Equally, are these additional requirements not just means of denying 
employees the exercise of their constitutional rights and therefore 
contravening the purpose of the Act in section 1?  
3) What about the separation of power between the legislature and the 
judiciary?48 Are the courts not assuming the role of the legislature by 
extending the limitations on right to strike by insisting that a strike notice 
should contain certain additional details? If the legislature wanted such 
limitations to be included in the Act it could have expressly done so. 
4) Although the intention of these amendments for the future of strike law is 
plausible, the question is: will they meet their stated objectives of reducing the 
ever increasing incidences of strike violence? Are they sufficiently spot-on to 
address the true basic realities that lie behind strike violence?  
 
1.5  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
In line with the above research questions, the study hopes to present a 
comprehensive understanding of what the purpose of a strike notice really is, since 
the LRA does not specifically deal with the issue in detail. It also endeavours to find 
                                                          
47  South Africa was re-admitted as a member of the ILO on 26 May 1994. This followed a period of 
30 years of isolation from international labour forums after the country withdrew from the ILO in 
1964 as a result of political pressure. 
48  Rautenbach Constitutional Law (2003) 78 notes that Legislative authority is charged with the 
power to make, amend and repeal rules of law while judicial authority has the power; if there is 
a dispute, to determine what the law is and how it should be applied in the disputes. 
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out what information should be contained in the notice because as the law currently 
stands, it is left up to the courts to decide. To achieve this, particular focus will be on 
case-law analysis up to the very recent legal position. More importantly, such a study 
is vital and desirable as it will help to prevent the over-limitation of this entrenched 
constitutional right to strike.  
 
Equally so, this study seeks to provide an insight as to whether the increase of 
content in a strike notice is not just a means of denying employees their constitutional 
right other than to promote labour peace as emphatically advocated by the Act. 
 
In closing it will be submitted that, within the South African context, these limitations 
particularly the ones extended by the courts, infringe the right to strike by causing 
undue or unreasonable limitations on the right to strike. The separation of powers 
between the legislative and judicial authorities is also interfered with as the courts in 
this regard seem to have assumed the role of the legislature because if the 
legislature desired such limitations to be included in the Act it could have expressly 
done so. 
 
1.6  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research encompasses an extensive review of qualitative literature which hence 
constitutes the basis for this research.  Both primary and secondary sources will be 
used. A collection of data in the form of legislation both national and international, 
cases both reported and unreported, ILO reports, journal articles, textbooks, existing 
data bases, policies, codes, the world-wide web, task-team reports, law-commission 
reports, conference speeches and presentations on strike notices have been 
gathered.  The collected data for the research will be analysed to achieve the 
anticipated outcome of the research. The analysis, data collection and process will 
take place simultaneously throughout the research to avoid the risk of data 
overloading, as well as to allow the researcher to approach the data analytically. The 
findings, recommendations and suggestions for improvements will be addressed 
throughout the research. A comparative analysis with other jurisdictions may be 
considered where necessary. 
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1.7  OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH 
The research consists of five chapters including the foregoing chapter. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Chapter 2 explores the history and development of a strike-notice requirement. 
Development, tracing back from the late 1980s up to the current legal position will be 
done.  
 
The study will consider the importance and the general purpose that strike notice 
serves. The significance of the strike notice, both to the employer/employer’s 
organisation and employees’ union will be highlighted.  It will also critique the 
effectiveness of strike notice and whether it still serves a useful purpose in the 
contemporary South African labour-relations landscape.  More importantly the 
research puts under the magnifying glass the debate surrounding the contents of the 
notice.  The study endeavours to present a comprehensive understanding as to what 
information should be contained in the strike notice, since the LRA does not 
specifically deal with the issue in detail.  As the law currently stands, it is left up to the 
courts to decide. 
 
Particular emphasis will be to find out the following: 
 
 Who must give the notice and to whom the notice must it be given?  It also 
considers what happens in case of delay and extension of notice period. 
 What and how much information should be contained in the notice?  
 Does the notice have to indicate the date and exact time at which the strike 
will commence?  
 Does the notice have to clearly articulate the issue(s) in dispute?  
 
These further increase to the contents in a strike notice by our courts will be 
measured against the Constitution.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Chapter 3 investigates the current prescribed statutory limitations on the right to 
strike.  The consequences of a protected and an unprotected strike under the LRA 
will be placed under the magnifying glass.  
 
CHAPTER 4 
Chapter 4 considers at whether a need for further limitation on the employees’ right 
to strike in really the best solution, as opposed to engaging in a meaningful collective 
bargaining process for the purposes of reaching a collective agreement. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Whether or not the right to strike in chapter IV of the LRA, as well as in the proposed 
amendment, is too limited as compared to the objectives of other jurisdiction and the 
ILO, is discussed in this chapter. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
  
 13 
CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF A STRIKE NOTICE 
REQUIREMENT AND THE CONTENT REQUIRED THEREIN 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
As noted in chapter one above, any employee and/ or union which, after the issuing 
of a certificate by the Commissioner, wishes to go out on strike must give an 
employer at least 48 hours’ notice in advance of the intended strike action or a 7 
days’ notice if the employer is the State unless the court allows for a shorter period.  
However, section 64(1)(b)(i) and (ii) contain an exception which requires that, where 
the issue in dispute relates to a collective agreement to be concluded in a council, 
such a notice must have been given to that council, or to where the employer is a 
member of an employers’ organisation that is a party to the dispute, the notice must 
have been given to that employers’ organisation. 
 
The focus of this chapter is to establish the role of a strike notice as one of the 
procedural requirements prior to a protected strike. The chapter will take us through 
the statutory law, case law and common law regarding strike-notice requirement. 
 
This chapter concludes with an evaluation of Bill 2012 proposal to be included in the 
contents of a strike notice and its consequences. 
 
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association places an obligation to parties who 
wish to embark on strike to issue a written prior notice to the employer indicating their 
intention to strike.49  Likewise, in the South African context, it forms a vital procedural 
requirement in terms of the LRA.50  This procedural requirement dates back as far as 
the late 1980s in the Industrial Court’s decision in the case of Metal and Allied 
Workers Union v BTR Sarmcol 51 and BAWU v Palm Beach Hotel.52  In both cases 
the employees who had been dismissed for striking, referred unfair labour-practice 
                                                          
49  ILO, The Committee on Freedom of Association 1996d, par 502-504. 
50  S 64(1)(b) of the Act. As discussed in Chapter 1 above. 
51  (1987) 8 ILJ 815 (IC). 
52  (1988) ILJ 1016 (IC) 1023g. 
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claims against their employers under the provisions of the 1956 Act.53  The Industrial 
Court found that employees who had gone on strike without giving any notice of 
strike to their employer had acted unfairly towards their employer.  The decisions in 
both these cases have revealed that the Industrial Court played a pivotal role in the 
development of the strike notice as a procedural requirement for protected industrial 
action in South Africa. 
 
It is at this background that this chapter discusses the history and development of the 
strike-notice requirement.  In order to effectively do so, it is essential to trace back 
these developments through case laws and court decisions up to the current legal 
position.  This will assist in discovering how the courts have construed the 
constitutionality of this requirement. 
 
2.2 METAL AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION v BTR SARMCOL54  
In this case, BTR Sarmcol55 employed 2160 employees.  Owing to the downturn in 
the general economy of the country as well as the rationalization of the production in 
the plants at BTR, an extensive and a prolonged retrenchment occurred. As a result, 
between 1981 and 1985, only 1108 employees had remained with a further reduction 
of 102 weekly-paid employees by 1985. This massive retrenchment gave rise to 
much dissatisfaction and uneasiness on the part of the workers. The court 
considered various aspects of the union’s behaviour prior to, during the strike, as well 
as after the dismissal of the employees for participation in the strike. Particularly, the 
court found that the conduct and the manner in which the principal strike was 
conducted by the strikers was unreasonable and unfair due to failure to give a prior 
written notice indicating when the strike would commence. 
 
In fact the court observed that, not only were the machines left running, but the 
strikers also intimidated some of the monthly-paid staff.56  
  
                                                          
53  Act 28 of 1956. Hereinafter referred to as the “1956 Act”. 
54  (1987) 8 ILJ 815 (IC). 
55  Hereinafter referred to as the BTR. 
56  (1987) 8 ILJ 815 (IC) 386G. 
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2.3  BAWU v PALM BEACH HOTEL57 
Just a year after BTR was decided, the court was faced with a similar situation in 
BAWU v Palm Beach Hotel.  In this case, the applicants were dismissed by Palm 
Beach Hotel following a strike on the 2nd May 1988.  They approached the court 
seeking for an order in terms of section 43(4)(b)(i) of the 1956 Act for their 
reinstatement on terms and conditions not less favourable to them than those which 
governed the employment of the individual applicants.  Similar in BTR Samcol, the 
court found that the conduct of the strikers was unreasonable and unfair in that they 
had not given a strike notice indicating when the strike would begin.  More 
importantly, the Industrial Court held that the failure to give notice was a serious 
failure, bearing in mind that the respondent [was] a hotel with obligations to its guests 
as the hotel had been fully booked for the Easter holidays, a fact that BAWU was 
most likely aware of.58  Further, the court noted that the applicants had no right to 
inconvenience the guests in this way and to gather in the foyer, thus further 
embarrassing the hotel guests.59  
 
Subsequent to BTR Samcol and BAWU decisions, wealth of judicial authorities were 
handed down by the Industrial Court to the same effect leading up to the late 1980s 
to mid-1990s.60  In the years that followed, the old Labour Appeal Court created 
under the 1956 Act,61 and the then Appellate Division of the Supreme Court also 
gave their endorsement to the notion that it could be unfair to the employer if 
                                                          
57  (1988) ILJ 1016 (IC) 1023G. Hereinafter referred to as the BAWU. 
58  (1988) ILJ 1016 (IC) 1020F. 
59  (1988) ILJ 1016 (IC) 1020G. See also Zondo Thesis on “The Requirement of Notice of Industrial 
Action in South African Labour Law” (2009) 7 10. 
60  See also the decisions in the following cases: Ray’s Forge & Fabrication (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & 
others (1989) 10 ILJ 762 (IC) par 773J; SACWU v SASOL Industries (Pty) Ltd & Another (2) 
(1989) 10 ILJ 1031 (IC) 1037C-E; BAWU & others v Asoka Hotel (1989) 10 ILJ 167 (IC) 177H-
178C; BAWU & others v Edward Hotel (1989) 10 ILJ 357 (IC); MWASA & others v Perskor 
(1989) 10 ILJ 1062 (IC) 1068-1069D; BTR Dunlop Ltd v NUMSA (2) (1989 10 ILJ 701 (IC) at 
707E-H; NTE v SACWU & others (1990) 11 ILJ 43 (N); FAWU v Middevrystaatse Suiwel Ko-
operasie Bpk (1990) 11 ILJ 776 (IC); FBWU & others v Hercules Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd (1990) 
11 ILJ 47 (LAC); FBWU & others v Hercules Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd (1989) 10 ILJ 457 (IC); 
Mercedes-Benz of SA (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (1991) 12 ILJ 667 at 672 (an arbitration award); 
NUMSA & others v MacSteel (Pty) Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 826 (A) at 835B; NUMSA & others v Malva 
(Pty) Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 1207 (IC) at 1216D-E; CWIU v Reckett Household Products (1992) 13 
ILJ 622 (IC); NUMSA v Three Gees Galvanizing (1993) 14 ILJ 372 (LAC); Doornfontein Gold 
Mining Co Ltd v Num & others (1994) 15 ILJ 527 (LAC) at 542B; SACWU & others v BHT Water 
Treatments (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 ILJ 141 (IC) at 163F-164A; NUMSA & others v Maranda Mining 
Co Ltd (1995) 16 ILJ 1155 (IC); FWCSA & others v Casbak Burger Box CC (1996) 17 ILJ 947 
(IC) 955C-I; NUMSA & others v Datco Lighting (Pty) Ltd (1996) 17 ILJ 315 (IC). 
61  S 17 of the 1956 Act. 
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employees went on strike without giving any prior written notice or warning to the 
employer of their intention to embark on strike.62 
 
In 1990 a technical committee of the National Manpower Commission was 
established to consider various proposals which had been made for the amendment 
of the 1956 Act.  That technical committee recommended that there be a statutory 
requirement for the giving of 24 hours’ written notice of the commencement of the 
strike for a strike to be regarded a lawful strike.63  In fact, two pieces of legislation 
were passed in 1993 which seems to suggest what could have been the first ever 
statutory requirement for a strike notice in the history of South African labour law. 
These were contained in sections 15(5) of the Education Labour Relations Act64 and 
section 19(4) of the Public Service Labour Relations Act.65 Expressing a similar view, 
Olivier wrote an article in which he evaluated the PSLRA against international labour 
standards as determined by the ILO, and discovered that a requirement for a strike 
notice was acceptable provided that the notice, especially the period, was 
reasonable.66 
 
Notably, under the 1956 Act there was no requirement that a union should issue the 
employer with a strike notice prior to embarking on a strike action.  However, in 1995, 
after the Act was passed, it contained a requirement in various sections for some or 
other notice to be given before a strike could be resorted to.67  This marked the first 
time in the history of South African labour law that a statute of general application68 
laid down such a requirement.  Worth noting is that, even though, prior to the Act, 
such a requirement was provided for in both the ELRA and the PSLRA as mentioned 
                                                          
62  See FBWU & others v Hercules Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ 47 (LAC); NUMSA & 
others v MacSteel (Pty) Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 826 (A) 835B; NUMSA v Three Gees Galvanising 
(1993) 14 ILJ 372 (LAC); Doornfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd v Num & others (1994) 15 ILJ 527 
(LAC) 542B. 
63  Smit and Fourie “Technical Committee of the National Manpower Commission: Proposals for 
the Consolidation of the Labour Relations Act” (1990) 11 ILJ 285 297). 
64  Act 146 of 1993. 
65  Act 102 of 1993. Hereinafter referred to as the PSLRA. See also an Explanatory Memorandum 
(1995) 16 ILJ 278 at 302.  
66  Olivier “Labour Relations for the Public Service” 1371 1388. See also Ben-Israel International 
Labour Standards 118. 
67  See fn 1 above. See also ss 66(2)(b) and 77(1)(b) and (d) of the Act. 
68  For instance, the Act is a law of general application within the meaning of s 36 of the 
Constitution and builds on the foundations of the Constitution by providing that: “Every 
employee has the right to strike and every employer has the right to lock-out as a recourse…” 
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above.  Those were, however, not statutes of general application, since their 
application was limited to the education sector and the public service respectively. 
 
2.4  CONTENT OF A STRIKE NOTICE 
Ever since the advent of the LRA in 1995, the key issues that have clouded our 
courts with regard to strike notices related to the increase in the content details 
therein and particularly, whether it specified the commencement and the scope of the 
proposed industrial action sufficiently.  As a consequence, this raised a discomfort 
amongst trade unions which strongly oppose that the ever increasing contents in the 
strike notices unduly limits the right to strike and should thus be subjected to the 
constitutional scrutiny.  
 
Besides the debate surrounding the contents of strike notice, other crucial questions 
have occasionally been central to the debate.  For example; who must give notice? 
And to whom must notice be given?  Should the details and the identity of the strikers 
be included in the strike notice?  Can a strike be commenced at a later stage than 
the date or time given in the notice?  What is the real purpose of a strike notice? 
 
This treatise does not intend to discuss in detail the court’s exposition in each one of 
these questions. 
 
However, it is suffice to point out that they do not cause many constitutional-
interpretation obstacles when considering the employees’ exercising of their 
constitutional right to strike.  Having said that, nonetheless, one key question that has 
sparked debate and that requires constitutional attention forms the core of this 
chapter is:  
 
 What information must be contained in the strike notice?  In other words, what 
information in the strike notices could be considered as sufficient and 
therefore does not severely restrict the employees’ constitutional right to 
strike? 
 
To effectively answer the above question, it is vital to firstly re-visit the interpretive 
provisions of the Act relating to strike notice in order to determine its meaning, scope 
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and application.  The interpretive provisions are contained in sections 39(1), (2) and 
(3), 232 and 233 of the Constitution, as well as section 1 read together with section 3 
of the Act.69 
 
The above provisions therefore oblige any person interpreting the Act to do so in light 
of the Constitution and South Africa’s international obligations.70  This leaves the 
courts with a crucial role in ensuring that the rights guaranteed in section 23(1) of the 
Constitution are honoured.  Equally, the courts have an important supervisory role to 
                                                          
69  S 39(1) of the Constitution deals with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. It reads: “(1) When 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – 
(a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b)  must consider international law; and 
(c)  may consider foreign case law.” 
S39(2) of the Constitution reads: “When interpreting any legislation and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.”  
S39(3) recognizes the existence of other rights other than those in the Bill of Rights. It reads: 
“(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that 
are recognized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent 
that they are consistent with the Bill.” 
S232 of the Constitution deals with the role and place of customary international law in South 
Africa. It reads: 
“s232. Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.” 
S233 of the Constitution deals with the role of international law in the construction of legislation 
in South Africa. It reads: 
“When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation 
of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law.” 
S1 of the Act states the purpose of the Act. It provides that the purpose of the Act is to “advance 
economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratization of the workplace”. 
It seeks to achieve this purpose by fulfilling the primary objects of the Act. The primary objects 
of the Act, as set out in s 1 thereof, include: 
(a)  giving effect to and regulating the fundamental rights conferred by s 23 of the 
Constitution. 
(b)  giving effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the ILO 
(c)  the provision of a framework for employees and trade unions, on the one hand, and 
employers and employers’ organizations, on the other, to bargain collectively to 
determine wages, terms and conditions of employment and other matters of mutual 
interest. 
(d)  the promotion of orderly collective bargaining, and 
(e)  the effective resolution of labour disputes. 
S3 of the Act deals specifically with the interpretation and application of the Act. It provides that: 
“Interpretation of this Act – Any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions – 
(a)  to give effect to its primary objects; 
(b)  in compliance with the Constitution; and 
(c)  in compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic.” 
70  S 3 of the Act. 
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ensure that legislation giving effect to Constitutional rights is properly interpreted and 
applied.  Du Toit observes that it is trite that the Act be interpreted in compliance with 
the framework of the Constitution and with South Africa's public international-law 
obligations.71  Several courts’ decisions draw special attention to the fact that security 
of employment forms a core value of the Act.  Section 3 of the Act thus bears 
testimony to the purposive approach72 in that it explicitly requires a court to interpret 
the provisions of the Act in compliance with the Constitution.73 
 
To return to the content of the strike notice, usually, as mentioned above, the key 
issues raised in our courts revolve around the contents of a strike notice.  Something 
therefore seems to be lacking in the Act when the contents required in a notice of 
strike are considered.  The reason for mentioning this is that the Labour Court and 
the Labour Appeal Courts have, over the past year or so, handed down a series of 
judgments that effectively create new additional rules to the procedural requirements 
as regards the notice of strike.  Closely read, sections 64(1)(b) and 64(1)(c) of the 
Act do not really indicate much regarding the strike notice.  In fact, these provisions 
require only that a trade union intending to go on a strike, must give 48 hours’ written 
notice of the strike or 7 days’ where the State is the employer.74  Apart from these 
time-periods, the Act is completely silent as to what must be included in the notice, 
the form it must take, the purpose thereof and whether it should clearly articulate the 
issue(s) to which dispute the strike relates. 
 
For this reason, all the above determinations are left to the discretion of the court to 
decide.  That being so, the question then arises: does this discretion to determine the 
contents required in the strike notice not amount to importing into the Act additional 
                                                          
71  See also Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 66. See also fn 22 above and Chirwa v Transnet 
Ltd and others [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC). 
72  Purposive approach requires that the Labour Legislation must be interpreted in a manner which 
best accords with the primary objective of the statute and s 39 of the Constitution. See Equity 
Aviation Survives (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU & others [2009] 10 BLLR 933 (LAC), NUMSA v Bader 
Bop (Pty) Ltd & Another (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC), SA Airways (PTY) Ltd v Aviation Union of SA & 
others and Mondi Packaging (Pty) Ltd v Director General: Labour & others (2013) 31 ILJ 2558 
(LAC). See also the minority judgement in SATAWU & Others v Moloto NO & Another (2012) 33 
ILJ 2549 (CC). 
73  De Waal et al the Bill of Rights Hand Book 131. 
74  Basson Essential Labour Law (2009) 318-319. See also Tiger Wheels Babelegi (Pty) Ltd t/a 
TSW International v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1999) 20 ILJ 677 (LC). 
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procedural limitations on the fundamental right to strike, and an unnecessary hurdle 
to the employees wishing to exercise their constitutional right to strike? 
 
2.5  WHAT INFORMATION MUST BE CONTAINED IN THE STRIKE NOTICE?  
SHOULD A STRIKE NOTICE INCLUDE THE EXACT TIME AND DATE ON 
WHICH THE STRIKE IS TO BE EXERCISED? 
 
2.5.1  CERAMIC INDUSTRIES LTD T/A BETTA SANITARY WARE & ANOTHER v 
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION BUILDING ALLIED WORKERS UNION & 
OTHERS75  
Notably, in some decisions the courts have emphasised that the strike notice must be 
fairly specific and must, for example, indicate the time of the commencement of the 
strike.  Additionally, other decisions seem to suggest that that alone is not enough. 
They suggest that the identity of the strikers must be mentioned in the notice. Be that 
as it may, the question that still lingers is: how much information must be contained in 
the notice, taking into consideration not to unduly limit the employees’ constitutional 
right to strike?  Clearly, a balance needs to be found due to Act’s silence regarding 
this issue.  
 
In Ceramic, the union served a notice on the employer informing it that “a strike shall 
start at any time after 48 hours from the date of this notice”.  The LAC held that the 
strike notice was invalid on the ground that it did not specify the precise day on which 
the strike will commence.  More importantly, the court pointed out that it is not 
sufficient to indicate on the strike notice that the strike will commence “at some future 
time”.  Grogan and Cheadle76 observe that the time to commence the strike need not 
be specified to the minute or hour, since strike notice could vary depending on the 
nature of the business.77  The court reiterated that section 64(1)(b) of the LRA must 
be interpreted and applied in a manner that best gives effect to the primary objectives 
of the LRA.  Similarly, it was emphasised in this judgment that the primary purpose of 
the strike notice is to give the employer advance warning of the proposed strike in 
                                                          
75  [1997] 6 BLLR 697 (LAC). Hereinafter referred to as Ceramic. See also Snyman, Van Heerden, 
De Jager and Heynes South African Labour Relations Explained (2008) 179; Fidelity Guard 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Professional Transport Workers Union & Others (1998) 20 ILJ 260 (LAC) 
and Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide (1999) 237. 
76  Cheadle et al Current Labour Law (2001) 73. 
77  In Grogan Collective Labour Law (2010) 168 for example Grogan observes that shift workers 
would need to state in their strike notice that the strike will commence from the start of a 
particular shift.  
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order that it might prepare for the ensuing power-play,78 or as Grogan puts it, a strike 
notice serves to warn the employer that “words are about to escalate into deeds”.79  
The court concluded therefore, that this purpose is defeated if the employer is not 
informed in the written notice in exact terms when the proposed strike will 
commence. 
 
Subsequently, the court in Western Platinum Ltd v National Union of Mine Workers80 
clarified the Ceramic Industries. Here, NUMSA notified the employer that the strike 
would commence on Wednesday, 15 March 2000 “on or before 15:00”.  While relying 
on Ceramic Industries, the employer argued that there was no compliance with 
section 64(1)(b) of the Act because the notice did not specify the exact time of the 
commencement of the strike.  The Labour Court differentiated between the two cases 
and found that in Ceramic Industries, the trade union did not specify the date and 
time but in this case, the date and time were specified.  It further argued that the 
purpose of the strike notice identified in Ceramic Industries was achieved.  The court 
was therefore satisfied that the strike notice complied with section 64(1)(b) of the Act. 
 
2.5.2 COUNTY FAIR FOODS v HOTEL LIQUOR CATERING & ALLIED 
WORKERS UNION81 
In this case, the employees engaged in a strike over the employer's refusal to 
bargain with the trade union because it no longer represented the majority of 
employees in the workplace.  The union referred its dispute for conciliation and after 
the 30 day period gave the employer more than 13 days’ notice of its intention to 
strike.  The issue before the court was whether this strike notice gave the employer 
proper warning and the opportunity to take other steps to protect its business.  The 
court held that it would be “formalistic in the extreme” to declare the notice invalid 
because it failed to specify the time of commencement.  Therefore the court 
concluded that a strike notice need not specify the precise time of the day when the 
strike will start.  Technically, the court noted that, if that would be the case, then a 
                                                          
78  [1997] 6 BLLR 697 (LAC). See also in Ceramic 701-702, where the court pointed out that the 
warning serves for two purposes: firstly, it allows the employer to prevent the intended power 
play by giving in to the employees demands or secondly, it cautions the employer to take steps 
to protect his/her business when the strike starts.  
79  Grogan Strike notices: What must they contain 1. See also Seady and Thompson “Strikes and 
Lockouts in South African Labour Law” De Jure 314. 
80  (2000) 21 ILJ 2502 (LC). 
81  (2006) 27 ILJ 348 (LC). 
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notice specifying that a strike will start on a specific day means that a strike will 
commence at the stroke of midnight. 
 
2.6 WHEN THE STRIKE DOES NOT START AT THE EXACT INDICATED TIME, 
DOES IT BECOME STALE OR LAPSE? 
 
2.6.1  SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS v SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPORT ALLIED 
WORKERS UNION82 (SATAWU) 
While referring to Ceramic Industries, the court in SA Airways v SATAWU reaffirmed 
that, although a strike is fundamental in its importance and purpose, it is not an end 
in itself.  The requirement of 48 hours’ notice of intended strike action is to afford the 
employer an opportunity to deliberate on the implications of the proposed action and 
to decide whether to resist or to accede to the employees’ demands.  The notice 
must therefore not only articulate the union’s and employees’ demands sufficiently for 
that purpose, but should also specify the date and the time at which the strike would 
begin.83  The court further noted that failure to do so would undermine orderly 
collective bargaining, a value to which the Act expressly subscribes.84 
 
What seems clear from the foregoing case law is that it is not sufficient to only state 
in the strike notice the date on which the strike will be embarked on.  A further 
requirement which in my opinion enjoys no textual support in the LRA is proposed, 
i.e. the inclusion of the exact or precise time at which the strike will commence.  The 
question that arises is: does the failure to indicate the exact time at which strike will 
commence really undermine orderly collective bargaining?  The answer should be 
negative because this requirement amounts to importing into the Act an additional 
limitation on the exercising of the constitutional right to strike. 
 
Furthermore, the court’s decisions in Ceramic Industries and South African Airways 
drive home a point that the inclusion in the strike notice of the exact time that a strike 
will commence is vital.  However, be that as it may, what happens if the strike does 
                                                          
82  (2010) IJL 1219 (LC). 
83  Par 26. See also Construction and Allied Workers Union & others v Modern Concrete Works 
[1999] 10 BLLR 1020 (LC) where a notice of an intended lock out was held to be deficient 
because it made reference only to a meeting at the CCMA and a failure to resolve “the current 
dispute”. 
84  Par 28. 
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not start at the exact indicated time?  Will that lead to an indication that the strikers 
have waived their right to strike, or does the notice lapse? 
 
Concerning this issue, the leading case of Tiger Wheels Babelegi TSW International 
v NUMSA85 will be considered. 
 
2.6.2  TIGER WHEELS BABELEGI (PTY) LTD TSW INTERNATIONAL v NUMSA 
In this case, the Labour Appeal Court took a somewhat more liberal view on strike-
notice requirement.  The court had to decide among other issues on the status of the 
strike notice.  The key question was whether the strikers who had failed to 
commence their strike on the day indicated on the strike notice, ie 1 September 
1999, were entitled to commence their intended strike 3 days after the day specified 
in the notice, ie 4 September 1999. 
 
Grogan and several other case laws seems to suggest that employees intending to 
go on strike are not obliged to embark on strike on the day indicated in the notice and 
similarly, their right to strike is not waived as long as it was preceded by proper 
referral.86 
 
In the Tiger Wheels Babelegi case, the court found that nothing in the Act obliged the 
employees to commence their strike on the time or date stipulated in the notice 
provided that it is within a reasonable time thereafter.87  It was noted further that the 
Act only requires at least a 48 hours’ written notice be served to the employer prior to 
the commencement of the strike.  The court emphasised that the question whether 
employees had waived their right to strike under the circumstances was a question of 
                                                          
85  (1999) 20 ILJ 677 (LAC). See also Transport Motor Spares v National Union of Metalworkers of 
SA (1999) 20 ILJ 690, SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union v Stuttafords Department Stores 
Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2692 (LC). 
86  Grogan Collective Labour Law 168. See also Chamber of Mines of SA v NUM & others(1987) 8 
ILJ 68 (A) and Free State Consolidated Gold Mines (operations) Ltd operating as President 
Brand Mine v NUM & others (1987) 8 ILJ 606 (O) 610F, Transportation Motor Spares v National 
Union of Metalworkers of SA and Others (1999) 20 ILJ 690 (LC). 
87  Chicktay 26th Annual Labour Conference Paper presented at Santon Convention Centre on 
Case Updates Johannesburg (30 July – 1 August 2013) 20. See also Du Toit et al Labour 
Relations Law; A Comprehensive Guide (1999) 384 385. See also Free State Consolidated 
Gold Mines (Operations) Ltd operating as President Brand Mine v NUM & others (1987) 8 ILJ 
606 (O) 610F and Smith and Thomas Smith and Woods Industrial Law (1996)  609. 
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fact that had to be determined inter alia by the length of the delay in commencing the 
strike. 
 
The court concluded that the employees and their union did not waive their right to 
strike, and as a result they were entitled to commence their strike on the 3rd day. 
Further, the court found that the delay was not unreasonable since the delay did not 
defeat the purpose of giving notice which was to give the employer advance warning 
in order to prepare for the power play that would follow.  However, in Western 
Platinum Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers,88 the court warned that a delay of over 
a year and a half was unreasonable and may render the dispute stale and 
consequently unprotected particularly since the union had never indicated a serious 
intention to strike.  
 
Aligning itself with Tiger Wheels Babelegi, the Labour Court in Public Servants 
Association of South Africa v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development89 
restated the principle that failing to commence the strike on the specified day in the 
strike notice does not invalidate the strike.  Further, unlike in the Western Platinum 
Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers case above, the court concluded in Public 
Servants Association of South Africa v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development that taking into account all surrounding circumstances, a delay of 19 
months to take a strike action was not unreasonable.  The court noted with caution 
that there was no any indication, evidence or act on the part the union that suggested 
that it had waived or abandoned its right to strike.90 
 
A similar question arose in Transport Motor Spares v National Union of Metalworkers 
of SA,91 where employees had commenced their strike on the day indicated in the 
strike notice, but had suspended the strike the following day in order to participate in 
retrenchment consultations with the employer.  Some 9 days later, the employees 
resumed the strike without giving a further notice of strike to the employer. For that 
                                                          
88  (2002) 21 ILJ 2502 (LC). 
89  [2001] 11 BLLR 1250 (LC). See also Transportation Motor Spares v National Union of 
Metalworkers of  SA and Others (1999) 20 ILJ 690 (LC) where it was held that if employees who 
have already commenced striking temporarily suspend the strike, they need not issue a fresh 
notice to strike or refer the dispute for conciliation again. 
90  689C-D. 
91  (1999) 20 ILJ 690 (LC). 
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reason, the employer argued that the strike was unprotected.  The court disagreed, 
finding that the employees who suspend a strike need not give a further notice before 
they resume the strike especially if the initial notice was properly given.  
 
Given the above conspicuous disparities many questions are left unanswered.  For 
instance, if failure to commence the strike on the specified day does not defeat the 
purpose of orderly collective bargaining as decided in the SATAWU judgment above, 
then, how can failure to indicate the exact time at which the strike will commence be 
said to defeat the purpose of the notice?  Even if it is said that it is not compulsory to 
commence a strike at the time or on the day given in the notice, and that the strike 
can commence on some later day, the follow-up question will be: would this 
interpretation of the statute not defeat the purpose of a strike notice as articulated by 
the court in the Ceramic Industries case?  
 
It is submitted that, where a strike notice indicates the date, failure to indicate the 
exact time does not undermine orderly collective bargaining.  To demand that a 
notice must not only indicate the date but also the exact time at which the strike will 
commence amounts to importing an additional requirement which unreasonably limits 
the fundamental right to strike. 
 
2.7 DOES THE ISSUE IN DISPUTE AS WELL AS THE IDENTITY OF ALL THE 
STRIKERS HAVE TO BE CLEARLY ARTICULATED IN THE STRIKE 
NOTICE? 
 
2.7.1  PUBLIC SERVANTS ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA v MINISTER OF 
JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The employer argued that the notice was defective because it did not clearly set out 
the “subject matter of the dispute”.  The court rejected this and held that the 
grievance need not be set out in the strike notice as the notice will have been 
preceded by negotiations and at conciliation meetings where opportunities would 
have been created to explore the nature and ambit of the demand or the dispute.  
The court noted further that the demand that the notice should clearly articulate the 
issue in dispute would amount to a “mere formality”. 
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In SAA v SATAWU 92 (discussed below) the court differed from the Public Servants 
Association of South Africa decision above.  The Labour Court stated that the 
employer must be in a position to know with some degree of precision which 
demands a union and its members intend to pursue through strike action, and what is 
required to meet those demands.93  The court held that, if a notice fails to clearly 
articulate the issue in dispute it renders the notice invalid because it undermines 
orderly collective bargaining. 
 
A view appears to have developed that an additional requirement is being introduced 
which further limits the employees constitutional the right to strike, as the court goes 
further than the Public Servants Association case above.  To demand that a notice 
must clearly articulate an issue in dispute overlooks the fact that during conciliation 
the issue in dispute and most key issues are examined.  Furthermore, it is to be 
noted that when the notice is issued the employer is already aware of the issue in 
dispute. 
 
2.7.2  SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPORT AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION 
(SATAWU) AND OTHERS v LEBOGANG MICHAEL MOLOTO NO AND 
ANOTHER94  
In this case, the respondents were the liquidators of Equity Aviation Services which 
rendered services to various airports within South Africa.  The majority of its 
employees were members of SATAWU. 
 
SATAWU issued a strike notice after the parties had failed to resolve a wage dispute 
through conciliation.  The strike notice stated that:  
 
“We intend to embark on strike action on 18 December 2003 at 08H00.”  
 
Employees who were not members of SATAWU participated in the strike 
notwithstanding their failure to comply with the provisions of section 65 of Act relating 
to protected strike action.  Accordingly, those employees who did not give the 
                                                          
92  (2010) JOL 24947 (LC). 
93  Par 27. 
94  [2012] ZACC 19 (CC). 
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required notice were subsequently dismissed for their unauthorized absence from the 
workplace. 
 
Both the SCA and the minority judgment in the Constitutional Court found in favour of 
the employer. They agreed with the employer that a purposive interpretation of the 
provisions is necessary and that is to warn the employer of the impending power play 
to enable it to make informed decisions. 
 
The court noted that in order to serve any purpose at all, the notice must be issued 
by, or on behalf of the parties who intend to strike.  This approach promotes orderly 
collective bargaining as it enables the employer to reasonably determine the extent 
of and properly prepare for the impending strike. 
 
The majority in the Constitutional Court disagreed with the above reasoning and held 
that the SCA had prescribed an incorrect meaning to section 64(1)(b) of the Act.  In 
terms of section 64(1)(b) of the Act every employee has the right to strike and every 
employer has recourse to lock-out, if in the case of a proposed strike, at least 48 
hours’ notice of the commencement of the strike has been given to the employer in 
writing. 
 
The Constitutional Court also emphasised that the language used by the legislature 
expressly requires only notice of the commencement of the strike to be given to the 
employer by anyone involved in the dispute, and does not oblige every participating 
employee to issue the notice to exercise the right to strike. 
 
The court stressed that, in interpreting the section to mean what it expressly says is 
less intrusive of the right to strike, it creates greater certainty than an interpretation 
that requires more information in the notice which serves the purpose of the Act 
particularly that of orderly collective bargaining, and gives proper expression to the 
underlying rationale of the right to strike, namely the balancing of social and 
economic power. The court further noted that to require more information than the 
time of its commencement in the strike notice from employees, in order to strengthen 
the position of the employer, would run counter to the underlying purpose of the right 
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to strike in our Constitution, namely to level the playing fields of economic and social 
power already generally tilted in favour of employers. 
 
The right to strike is a fundamental right in our Constitution.  The Act contains no 
express requirement that every employee who intends to participate in a strike must 
personally or through a representative issue a notice.  There is no need for the non-
union members to issue a separate notice, and therefore according to the 
Constitutional Court's decision other trade unions’ members or non-union employees 
are entitled to piggyback on a strike notice which has not been issued on their behalf. 
 
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH PARTIES MAY DISPENSE WITH SECTION 
64(1) STATUTORY PROCEDURE 
Section 64 (3) of the Act provides an employer or employee, as the case may be, 
with four exceptions requiring no need to give the prescribed 48 hours’ strike notice 
and conciliation. These are discussed below. 
 
 In terms of section 64(3)(a) of the Act, there will be no need for a further strike 
notice if parties to the dispute are members of a bargaining council and the 
dispute has been dealt with by that bargaining council in accordance with its 
constitution. However, such provisions in the bargaining council’s constitution 
must be valid.95 In Security Services Employers’ Organisation & others v SA 
Transport & Allied workers Union,96 for example, the employer approached the 
Labour Court seeking for an interdict against a strike by the security guards, 
based on an addendum to the council’s constitution. The addendum provided 
that disputes should be settled by a majority vote instead of proportional 
representation. 12 unions had engaged in the strike. However, after the strike 
was called off, save for only 1 union (SATAWU), the other 11 unions agreed 
on a wage agreement between them and the employer. Evidently, the rule for 
settlement by majority vote would have stripped of SATAWU its voting power, 
which had been based on its having had as members an overwhelming 
majority of employees falling within the council’s jurisdiction The employer, 
without success, appealed to the LAC against the decision of the Labour Court 
                                                          
95  Grogan Collective Labour Law 171. 
96  [2006] ZALAC 3. 
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which had found that the Council’s purported adoption of the amendment was 
in breach of its constitution and therefore void.  
 
 Under section 64(3)(b) of the Act parties may enter into a collective agreement 
in terms of which they agree on a procedure to be followed prior to embarking 
on a strike.  This agreement may include that a notice or an alternative 
method of notification be used, and hence the strike will be considered 
protected.  The Labour Court noted in Columbus Joint Venture t/a Columbus 
Stainless Steel v NUMSA97 that strikers have two avenues of ensuring that 
their strike is protected.  One is to comply with the provision of section 64(1); 
the other is to comply with the procedure contained in a collective agreement. 
The court added that the choice rests with the would-be strikers.  Once they 
have complied with the provision of section 64(1), even though they failed to 
comply with the collective agreement, the strike will be protected.  Similarly, 
this reasoning was followed by the LAC in Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Food 
& Allied Workers Union and Others.98 
 
 Where the employees strike in response to an unprotected lock-out by the 
employer, in terms of section 64(3)(c) of the Act, such employees are 
exempted from following the procedural requirements. In the same way, if 
employees embark on an unprotected strike, the employer may respond by 
means of an automatically protected lock-out, despite non-compliance with 
section 64 procedures.99  Grogan observes that it would be time-consuming to 
go through the prescribed procedures if the employees or the employer as the 
case seek to retaliate for an unlawful strike or lock-out respectively.100 
 
 In terms of section 64(3)(e) read together with section 64(4) and (5) of the Act, 
no notice of a strike need be given where the employer has unilaterally 
                                                          
97  [1997] 10 BLLR 1292 (LC).   
98  (2001) 22 ILJ 1103 (LAC). See also Chubb Guarding SA (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU (2005) 26 ILJ 
1670 (LC) where the court declined to follow the approach in Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v 
Food & Allied Workers Union and others above by finding that the number of workers who 
participated in the secondary strike was disproportional to the number engaged in the primary 
strike. 
99  Basson  et al Essential Labour Law 323.  
100  Grogan Collective Labour Law 172 173. 
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changed the employees’ terms and conditions of employment or threatens to 
introduce such changes, and the employer has failed to comply with a request 
that it revoke the changes or through an interdict refrain from implementing 
them.101  Section 64(4) of the Act is often referred to as the status quo 
provision.  The section requires that an employee or trade union referring a 
dispute concerning a unilateral change of terms and conditions of employment 
to a bargaining council or to the CCMA, in the referral, and for the period of 
conciliation process,102 requires the employer not to implement unilaterally the 
change to the terms and conditions of service, or if the employer has already 
done so, to restore the status quo. 
 
Notably, the relief afforded under section 64(5) of the Act is only temporary 
since the employer is precluded from implementing the change only until that 
moment when the employees acquire the right to embark on strike.  This 
means therefore that, as soon as the certificate is issued or 30 days since the 
referral, the changes may be implemented unilaterally by the employer.103 
 
2.8  CONCLUSION 
As discussed above, the procedural requirement of a strike notice prior to strike 
dates back as far as the late 1980s in the Industrial Court’s decision. 
 
Section 64(1)(b) and (c) of the Act do not indicate much about the strike notice.  The 
Act only requires that a trade union intending to embark on a strike must give a 48 
hours’ strike notice (or 7 days’ if the employer is the State).  Besides this, the Act is 
silent regarding the content, the form it must take and whether it should specify the 
                                                          
101  See Staff Association for the Motor and Related Industries (SAMRI) v Toyota of SA Motors (Pty) 
Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ 374 (LC) where the court found that a unilateral change to an employee’s 
motor benefit scheme fell within the ambit of s 64(4) and (5) of the Act and the conduct of the 
employer accordingly contravened these provisions . Contrary, in NUMSA & others v Alfred 
Teves Technologies (Pty) Ltd [2002] 10 BLLR 995 (LC), the court dismissed an application for 
an interdict restraining the employer from implementing the new shift system and from 
disciplining the employees who refused to comply with it. The court found that a change in shift 
arrangements was not a unilateral amendment to the workers’ terms and conditions of 
employments. 
102  Kgasago v Meat Plus CC [1999] 5 BLLR 424 (LAC). 
103  See SATAWU v Natro Freight (Pty) Ltd [2006] 8 BLLR 749 (LC). See also Monyale v Bruce 
Jacobs t/a LV Construction (1998) 19 ILJ 75 (LC) where similarly the court confirmed that the 
notice operates until a certificate is issued or until 30 days period has elapsed. 
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issue in dispute.  Building on earlier case law, the Labour Court confirmed that the 
two main purposes of a strike notice is, firstly, to enable the employer to decide 
whether its interests are best served by giving in to the union’s demand and, second, 
to take steps to protect its business.  This means that a strike notice must specify the 
date and time at which the strike action was to commence as this would enable the 
employer to take whatever steps it wished to take in order to protect its business at 
the time the strike commences. 
 
What, however, stands out in all of these cases is the fact that it is the purpose of the 
strike notice to give the employer a chance to reflect on the proposed action and their 
response thereto.  Section 64(1)(c), read in its proper context and read against at 
least two of the primary objectives of the Act, which is to promote collective 
bargaining and to promote the effective resolution of labour disputes, must be 
interpreted to mean that the 48 hours’ notice serves as an opportunity to parties to 
reflect on the consequences of the strike or lock-out notice.  Any other reading of this 
section would undermine the primary objectives of the LRA as set out in section 1 of 
the Act. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court decision in Equity Aviation Services v SATAWU dealt with 
the question whether the employer was entitled to know exactly who would 
participate in a strike.  The majority in this court held that the employer is entitled only 
to notice the commencement of the strike, and it is not entitled to be informed of the 
identity of the employees who will participate in the strike. 
 
It must be borne in mind that most decisions discussed in this chapter have 
extensively extended the requirements of the strike notice, as laid down in section 
64(1) of the Act.  It is no longer sufficient for the union merely to give notice; our 
courts now require a lot more detail.  There are judicial uncertainties as 
demonstrated in case law at this stage, such as how much precision will be required 
of a trade union when it formulates a strike notice.  But one requirement that stands 
out clearly is that the unions can no longer just notify the employer of the date and 
time at which the strike will commence.  No doubt, further developments on this point 
can be expected. 
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Notably, the proposed amendments intend to achieve their purpose by further limiting 
the circumstances within which strike action can be taken.  It is proposed that, if the 
dispute is one which can be referred to arbitration or the Labour Court in terms of any 
employment law, strike action is prohibited. 
 
Therefore, although the Labour Relations Amendment Bill 2012 attempts to create 
some form of structure regarding the purpose of and execution of industrial action, 
just as with any other proposed amendments, ambiguity must first be eliminated to 
ensure successful implementation of the suggested changes, particularly regarding 
the issue of strike notice in section 64 (1)(b) (c) of the Act. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS OF RIGHT TO STRIKE AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF A PROTECTED AND AN UNPROTECTED 
STRIKE UNDER THE LRA 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
As it was noted in Chapter 2, strike notice forms a very important procedural 
requirement prior to embarking on a strike.  Much debate concerning the purpose it 
serves to the employer and the employee continues to spark even more discussion.  
Similarly, the ever increasing content required in a strike notice by our courts 
arguably still poses some unnecessary limitations for the employees wishing to 
exercise their constitutional right to strike.  
 
Against this backdrop, this chapter continues to discuss this field of law that has 
undergone dramatic changes over the last few years.  Besides the limitations 
imposed by means of the contents in a strike notice, this chapter explores other 
limitations imposed on the right to strike as spelt out in the LRA.  This is in 
consequence of the increasing of the already existing limitations that form the 
foundation upon which more complex limitations on the right to strike have been 
constructed by our courts over the last few years.  Indeed, the various limitations all 
serve to promote the overt purpose of the Act in order to orderly collective 
bargaining.  In the end, the consequences of engaging in an unprotected strike as 
well as protected strike are explained. 
 
As pointed out earlier, the right to strike is entrenched and guaranteed to every 
worker in terms of section 23 of the Constitution.  However, like any other right in the 
Bill of Rights, this right is not unlimited.104  Despite the fact that it is constitutionally 
                                                          
104  However, s 36 of the Constitution contains a limitation clause. It stipulates that “The rights in the 
Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application (the LRA is a good 
example of law of general application) to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society  based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including -  
a)  the nature of the right;  
b)  the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
c)  the nature and extent of the limitation;  
d)  the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
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protected, the right to strike must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of 
the Act.  Section 65 of the LRA imposes limitations to the right to strike.  When read 
together with section 23 of the Constitution, section 64 of the Act sets out the 
procedures required to be followed in order to regard the strike as protected. 
However, the court has found that in certain circumstances, even if the procedural 
requirements set out in section 64 above have been complied with, a strike may still 
be unprotected.105 
 
3.2  LIMITATIONS OF RIGHT TO STRIKE IN TERMS OF THE LRA 
Because the right to strike is so important, a limitation of some kind needs to be 
justified and, to be justified it needs, among other things, to be limited.106 The 
provisions of section 65, perhaps unfortunately worded, impose limitations on the 
right to strike in subsection 1, and then places further limitations in subsection 3. All 
ought to have been combined into subsection 1.  Be that as it may, the provision of 
section 65 imposes an absolute prohibition on strikes based on six grounds.  These 
grounds, which will be discussed separately where:   
 
 The person is bound by collective agreement that prohibits a strike in respect 
of the issue in dispute. 
 An agreement requires the issue in dispute to be subjected to compulsory 
arbitration. 
 The issue in dispute is one that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or to 
the Labour Court in terms of the Act, for example dismissal for misconduct, 
unfair discrimination and retrenchment. 
 That person is engaged in an essential service, or a maintenance service. 
 There is an arbitration award, a collective agreement that regulates the issue 
in dispute, or any determination made by the Minister that regulates the issue 
in dispute. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
e)  less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
Moreover, except as provided in ss (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may 
limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
105  See Bader National Union of Metal Workers of SA & Others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd & Another 
(2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC). 
106  Brad How the law could better regulate the right to strike in South Africa Paper presented at the 
27th Annual Labour Law Conference: The changing face of Labour Law (August 2014) 38. 
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 There is a determination made in terms of the Wage Act during the first year of 
that determination which regulates the issue in dispute. 
 
3.2.1 COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS THAT PROHIBIT A STRIKE 
Section 65(1)(a) of the Act prohibits a person bound by a collective agreement from 
embarking upon a strike action if the collective agreement prohibits a strike.  What 
this essentially implies is that the employer and a registered trade union cannot 
contract out of the right to strike by way of collective agreement.  Basson107 reasons 
that this prohibition prevents employees and employers from strikes and lock-outs 
respectively, where the collective bargaining parties themselves have restricted the 
right to strike or recourse to lock-out.  Noteworthy is that the agreement prohibiting 
the strike must be a collective agreement as defined in section 213 of the Act.108  For 
this reason therefore, only a trade union may waive employee’s right to strike.  The 
Act does not envisage an individual employee contracting out of his/her right to strike 
simply because a single employee is considered too vulnerable to employer power to 
allow them the “liberty” to contract away their rights, unlike when the union acts in the 
employee’s stead.  Similarly, such an act from the employee could in any event be 
unenforceable as a breach of section 5(4) of the Act.109  
 
Grogan opines that the scope of section 65(1)(a) of the Act depends typically on the 
terms agreed upon.110  A further observation shows that collective agreements in 
which employees abandon the right to strike in respect of all disputes are not 
common since such a peace clause applies only in respect of a specific kind of 
dispute.  In Vista University v Botha and Others,111 for example, there was a 
                                                          
107  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 131. 
108  In terms of s 213 of the Act, a collective agreement means a written agreement concerning 
terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest concluded by one or 
more registered trade unions, on the one hand and, on the other hand- 
 (a)  one or more employers; 
 (b)  one or more registered employers' organisations; or 
 (c)  one or more employers and one or more registered employers' organisations; “council” 
includes a bargaining council and a statutory council. 
109  This section stipulates that “A provision in any contract, whether entered into before or after the 
commencement of this Act, that directly or indirectly contradicts or limits any provision of section 
4, or this section, is invalid, unless the contractual provision is permitted by this Act.” 
110  Grogan Collective Labour Law (2010) 176. 
111  (1997) 18 ILJ 1040 (LC). Further, it was held in this case that employees who were members of 
a trade union at the time it concluded a collective agreement with an employer, will be bound for 
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collective agreement concluded that no strike was to be allowed in cases of dispute 
of rights as defined in the agreement itself.  After interpreting the definition, the court 
found that the issues in dispute fell within the terms of the peace clause and that the 
strike was accordingly unlawful.  By the same token, the court held in Cape Gate 
(Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & Others112 that union parties to a council agreement that 
required bargaining to be concluded at sectoral level could not strike over disputes 
regarding the residue issues left for bargaining at plant level.  
 
On the contrary, the Labour Court in Enforce Guarding (Pty) Ltd v National Security & 
Unqualified Workers Union & others113 declined to accept that a collective agreement 
governing shift arrangement precluded the union from calling a strike over overtime. 
Also, the Labour Court has found in its subsequent decision that a written 
undertaking by employees that they would abandon their demand that a supervisor 
be disciplined constituted a collective agreement, and therefore they were precluded 
from striking over that issue.114  
 
3.2.2  AN AGREEMENT REQUIRES THE ISSUE IN DISPUTE TO BE SUBJECTED 
TO COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 
In terms of section 65(1)(b) of the Act, the right to strike will be precluded if the 
parties to a dispute agree that a particular dispute that is likely to be the subject of a 
strike, be resolved by way of arbitration. 
 
Worth mentioning is that, unlike section 65(1)(a) above, the reference here is the 
existence of a written “agreement” and not a collective agreement.  Therefore an 
agreement referred here could include both a collective agreement as well as 
individual agreements between employers and employees, for instance employment 
contracts or settlement agreements to settle a particular dispute by arbitration.115  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the life of the agreement, even if they cease to be members of the union. Any strike prohibition 
contained in such agreement will therefore continue to bind them. 
112  (1997) 18 ILJ 1040 (LC). 
113  (2001) 22 ILJ 2457 (LC). 
114  NUMSA v Hendor Mining Supplies (a division of Marschalk Beleggings (Pty) Ltd) (2003) 24 ILJ 
2171 (LC). 
115  Grogan Collective Labour Law 178. 
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Grogan observes that the Act does not limit the issues that may be reserved for 
arbitration in an agreement.116  For that reason, an employee may agree to refer both 
rights and interests disputes to arbitration, and will be prohibited from striking in 
respect of such disputes for the duration of the agreement.  Arguably, whether this 
provision is constitutional or unconstitutional remains contentious since enforcing 
agreements where an individual employee contracts away his/her right to strike 
constitutes an impediment and unreasonable limitation on the employee’s 
constitutional right to strike.   
 
3.2.3 THE ISSUE IN DISPUTE IS ONE THAT A PARTY HAS THE RIGHT TO 
REFER TO ARBITRATION OR TO THE LABOUR COURT IN TERMS OF 
THE ACT 
This is arguably one of the most significant of the limitations on the right to strike. 
With certain exceptions,117 section 65(1)(c) of the Act provides that a person may not 
participate in a strike if the issue in dispute is one that the party has a right to refer to 
arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms of the Act.  In other words, where 
employees have an existing right that they are able to enforce against the employer 
through litigation, strike action is absolutely prohibited.118  
 
A similar line of thought was articulated by the Constitutional Court in National Union 
of Metalworkers of SA & Others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd & Another,119 where the 
Constitutional Court stressed that section 65(1)(c) of the Act prohibits a strike where 
a party has a right to refer the dispute to arbitration or the Labour Court.  
                                                          
116  Ibid. 
117  S 65(2) (a) of the LRA creates an exception to this rule. It provides that: Despite section 
65(1)(c), a person may take part in a strike or lock-out or in any conduct in contemplation or in 
furtherance of a strike if the issue in dispute is about organisational rights dealt with in sections 
12 to 15. 
(b)  If the registered trade union has given notice of the proposed strike in terms of section 
64(1) in respect of an issue in dispute referred to in paragraph (a), it may not exercise the 
right to refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of section 21 for a period of 12 months 
from the date of the notice. 
118  See TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd & Others v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2004) 25 
ILJ 1080 (LC); although on Appeal in TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd & Others v National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA & others (2004) 27 ILJ 1483 (LAC) par 27, the LAC found that the strikers 
had actually demanded that the supervisor be dismissed come what may. The LAC without 
referring to Ceramics appears to have rejected the view expressed in that judgement that the 
Labour Court should look beyond the actual demand to identify the true issue in dispute. Early 
Bird Farm (Pty) Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union & others (2004) 25 ILJ 2135 (LAC); 
National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Highveld Steel & Vanadium Corporation Ltd 
(2002) 23 ILJ 895 (LAC). 
119  (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC). 
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More importantly, Grogan correctly observes that in order to determine whether a 
strike action is hit by the proscription, the court must first identify the issue in dispute 
and the dispute-resolution provisions provided for in the Act.120  This has proved to 
be a daunting task as found in Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitaryware v 
National Construction Building & Allied Workers Union (1),121 in which the union had 
referred three disputes to the CCMA, one of which the Labour Court found was 
arbitrable, the others not.  Subsequently in Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary-
ware v National Construction Building & Allied Workers Union (2)122 the LAC had the 
following to say: 
 
“The Union’s initial complaint was the alleged harassment of the union official 
and employees … [T]hat were a justiciable rights dispute with a specific remedy 
to be pursued in the Labour Court. The union could not convert the nature of 
that underlying dispute into a non-justiciable one simply by adding a demand for 
a remedy falling outside those provided for by the Act. The tail cannot wag the 
dog. If such an approach is allowed, an underlying rights dispute normally 
justiciable or arbitrable in terms of the Act could be transformed into a strike-
able issue simply by adding a demand for a remedy not provided for in the Act. 
That would be unacceptable. Even if the issue in dispute is not articulated as a 
substantive complaint coupled with a specific demand, but rather in the form of 
a complaint about the refusal of the specific demand itself, the position would 
not change. The refusal of a demand, or the failure to remedy a grievance, 
always needs to be examined in order to ascertain the real dispute underlying 
the demand or remedy. The demand or remedy will always be sought to rectify 
the real, underlying, dispute. It is the nature of that dispute that determines 
whether a strike in relation to it is permissible or not.” 
 
Another formulation was developed in Fidelity Guard Holding (Pty) Ltd v PTWU,123 
where the LAC held that the fundamental enquiry was to establish what the demand, 
the grievance or the dispute is that forms the subject matter of the strike.  The court 
achieved this by looking at the following factors: 
 
 Prior negotiations between the parties. 
 The correspondence between the parties immediately prior to the referral to 
the CCMA. 
 The correspondence between the parties and the CCMA after conciliation, and 
                                                          
120  Grogan Collective Labour Law 178.  
121  (1997) 18 ILJ 671 (LC) 23. 
122  (1997) 18 ILJ 671 (LAC) 14. 
123  [1997] 9 BLLR 1125 (LAC) 32.  
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 The advisory award made in this case by the CCMA. 
 
Contrary to the LAC’s judgment in Fidelity Guard Holding above, the LAC’s in Adams 
& Others v Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd124 found that the approach adopted in 
Fidelity Guard Holding on the issue was inconsistent.  The court stressed that it is the 
court's duty to ascertain the true or real issue in dispute.125 
 
In practice the Act bars employees from striking in disputes concerning the following 
matters: 
 
 Freedom of associations rights contained in section 9. 
 Organisational rights save for matters falling within section 12 to 15. 
 The interpretation or application of a collective agreement in section 24. 
 An agency-shop and closed-shop agreement in section 24(6) and (7) 
respectively. 
 Admission of parties to council or expulsion from the bargaining councils in 
terms of section 56. 
 Picketing in terms of section 69. 
 Disputes concerning matters reserved for joint decision-making under section 
86. 
 Dismissal disputes with the exclusion of certain retrenchments. 
 Alleged unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices in terms of section 191. 
 
                                                          
124  (1999) 20 ILJ 1192 (LAC) 16. 
125  See also Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitaryware v National Construction Building & Allied 
Workers Union & others (2) (1997) 18 ILJ 671 (LAC); Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Professional Transport Workers Union & others (1) (1998) 19 ILJ 260 (LAC). In conducting that 
enquiry a court looks at the substance of the dispute and not at the form in which it is presented 
(Fidelity at 269G-H; Ceramic at 678C). The characterization of a dispute by a party is not 
necessarily conclusive (Ceramic at 677H-I; 678A-C). In the Court’s view, there was no 
difference in the approach of these decisions. In each case the court was concerned to 
establish the substance of the dispute. The importance of doing this lies in s 65 of the Act which 
provides that no person may take part in a strike if “the issue in dispute is one that a party has 
the right to refer to arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms of this Act …”. The phrase ‘issue 
in dispute’ is, in relation to a strike, defined as 'the demand, the grievance, or dispute that forms 
the subject matter of the strike”. 
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It has been observed that all disputes not covered within the ambit of the above 
provisions are regarded as “matters of mutual interest” and accordingly, neither the 
Labour Court nor the arbitrator may determine the merits of such matters.126 
 
3.2.4 THE PERSON IS ENGAGED IN AN ESSENTIAL SERVICE, OR A 
MAINTENANCE SERVICE 
Section 65(1)(c) of the Act provides that, where the employer is engaged in either an 
essential service127 or a maintenance service,128 strike is prohibited.  However, the 
employer must first be declared an essential service or a maintenance service by the 
Essential Service Committee (ESC) in terms of sections 70 to 73 of the Act.  In terms 
of section 72 of the Act, the ESC may approve and ratify a collective agreement that 
provides for the maintenance services in a service designated as an essential 
service.  The effect of such agreement is that only workers who are in the designated 
minimum service may strike, the rest must refer the matter to a compulsory 
arbitration.  According to Grogan, the reason for these prohibitions is to limit strike 
action where the effect of such action would be to endanger life, health or safety of 
the public or create major social dislocation.129  
 
In SA Police Services v Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union,130 the question was 
whether the prohibition on strikes in essential services applies to all employees in the 
services concerned or only to those who performed work directly linked to the 
provisions of the essential service. The Labour Court held that only members of the 
South African Police Service (SAPS) employed under the South African Police 
Service Act (SAPSA)131 were engaged in essential services under the LRA. 
 
                                                          
126  Grogan Collective Labour Law 178. 
127  In terms of s 231 of the Act, an "essential service" (more narrowly defined as compared to the 
previous Act (1956 Act) means 
“(a)  a service the interruption of which endangers the life, personal safety or health of the 
whole or any part of the population;  
(b)  the Parliamentary service;  
(c)  the South African Police Services.” 
128  S 75(1) of the Act provides that a service is a maintenance service if the interruption of that 
service has the effect of material physical destruction to any working area, plant or machinery. 
129  Grogan Collective Labour Law 190. See also Basson et al Essential Labour Law 314 and Du 
Plessis & Fouche A Practical Guide to Labour Law (2007) 357. 
130  (2007) 28 ILJ 2611 (LC). 
131  Act 68 of 1995. 
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The decision of the Labour Court was subsequently appealed to LAC. In SA Police 
Services v Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union,132 the LAC confirmed the decision of 
the Labour Court that only members and deemed members of the SAPS employed 
under the SAPSA and engaged in police duties were actually prohibited from striking 
by the provisions of section 65 read with section 71(10) of the Act.  Accordingly, the 
personnel employed by the SAPS in terms of the Public Service Act (PSA),133 
including prison officers, are not prohibited from striking.  
 
The SAPS appealed against the decision of the LAC to the Constitutional Court. In 
SA Police Services v Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union and Another134 the 
Constitutional Court had to consider the proper interpretation and meaning of 
“essential service” as defined in section 213, read with sections 65(1)(d)(i) and 
71(10) of the Act, in the context of the right to strike provided for in section 23(2)(c) of 
the Constitution. 
 
The Constitutional Court held that a restrictive interpretation of essential service 
should, if possible, be adopted so as to avoid impermissibly limiting the right to strike. 
The court remarked that defining “essential service” too broadly would impermissibly 
limit the right to strike.135  
 
After considering the meaning of “essential services”, the Constitutional Court 
concluded that persons who were engaged in essential service, and prohibited from 
striking in terms of section 65(1)(d)(i) of the Act, are members of the SAPS, and this 
included the “personnel employed” in the SAPS and designated as members in terms 
of section 29 of the SAPSA.136  The Constitutional Court re-affirmed that the LAC 
could not be faulted in holding that not all SAPS employees were engaged in an 
essential service, and confirmed the judgment of the LAC. 
 
                                                          
132  (2010) ILJ 2844 (LAC) . 
133  Proclamation 103 of 1994. 
134  (2011) 32 ILJ 1603 (CC). 
135  Par 31. 
136  Par 30. 
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3.2.5  AN ARBITRATION AWARD OR A COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 
REGULATES THE ISSUE IN DISPUTE OR ANY DETERMINATION MADE 
BY THE MINISTER THAT REGULATES THE ISSUE IN DISPUTE 
In terms of section 65(3)(a)(i) of the Act, employees may not strike if the issue in 
dispute that may form the subject of a strike is regulated by a collective agreement. 
The reasons for this limitation are two-fold.  In the first place the dispute has been 
resolved and the award given is final and binding.  The second reason is to uphold 
the sanctity of the collective agreement since parties should remain bound by the 
terms of the settlement.137  Consequently, the court has noted that parties should not 
be entitled to have two bites at the cherry, in other words, if the result of the 
arbitration is not of their liking, they ought not to seek to obtain a more favourable 
result through strike.138 
 
3.2.6  ANY DETERMINATION MADE IN TERMS OF THE WAGE ACT AND THAT 
REGULATES THE ISSUE IN DISPUTE, DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF 
THAT DETERMINATION 
Section 65(3)(b) states that, where the Minister has made a determination in terms of 
the Wage Act,139 that regulates the issue in dispute, employees may not take part in 
in a strike during the first 12 months of the existence of this determination.  Section 
8(1)(a) to (c) of the Wage Act regulates only the minimum rates of remuneration and 
hence opens to the parties the right to strike over improved wages in the ordinary 
bargaining.  Worth mentioning is that, after the LRA came into operation, the Wage 
Act was repealed by the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), and therefore 
Basson points out correctly that section 65(3)(b) of the Act will have to be 
reconsidered.140 
 
                                                          
137  See Samancor Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others (2002) 21 ILJ 2305 (LC); 
SA Motor Industry Employers Association & Another v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & 
Others (1997) 18 ILJ 1301 (LAC). 
138  See Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Bevaloid (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 ILJ 447 (W); Afrox Ltd v 
SA Chemical Workers & others (1) (1997) 18 ILJ 399 (LC) 406; Grogan (2007) Workplace Law 
392. See also Basson  et al Essential Labour Law 314 and Du Plessis & Fouche A Practical 
Guide to Labour Law (2007) 318. 
139  Act 5 of 1957. 
140  Basson  et al Essential Labour Law 317. According to Basson the BCEA provides for a system 
of sectorial determination regulating basic conditions of employment made by the Minister on 
the advice of the Employment Conditions Commission which are equivalent to wage 
determinations made in terms of the Wage Act. 
 43 
Despite the limitations in section 65, the proposed amendments to section 65 of the 
Act seek to broaden the restrictions on employees and trade unions taking strike 
action.  Worth noting is that the LRA Amendment Bill, section 65(1)(c), now provides 
that no person may participate in a strike if that party has a right to refer the dispute 
to arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms of the Act or any other employment law. 
Any other employment law would include, for instance, the Employment Equity Act141 
which will deal with unfair discrimination disputes.  The proposed amendments to the 
LRA suggests that this extension strives to eliminate the anomalous distinction 
between disputes that can be adjudicated under the Act in respect of which strike is 
currently restricted, and those under other employment laws in respect of which there 
is no equivalent restriction.  This further proposed limitation should be revisited since 
it broadens the scope and limits unnecessarily the employees’ constitutional right to 
strike.  
 
3.3  THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF PROTECTED STRIKE IN TERMS OF 
THE ACT  
Section 67 of the Act provides for the extent of a protected strike.  This entails that 
employees may not be dismissed for striking if they comply with the requirements 
discussed above.142 
 
3.3.1  IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL LIABILITY AND BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Section 67(2) of the Act provides an indemnity against civil liability and breach of 
contract to employees who engage in a protected strike or any conduct in 
contemplation or participation in a protected strike.143  In spite of this protection, 
section 67(3) of the Act indicates that an employer, subject to two limitations,144 is not 
obliged to remunerate an employee for services that the employee does not render 
during protected strike and may employ replacement labour.  Grogan opines that, if a 
                                                          
141  Act 55 of 1998. 
142  See the discussion in Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v PTWU & Others [1997] 9 BLLR 1125 
(LAC) 1132 and in Afrox Ltd v SA Chemical Workers Union & Others (2) (1997) 18 ILJ 406 (LC) 
410D-E. 
143  SA Chemical Workers Union & Others v Afrox Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC). 
144  S 67(3)(a) “if the employee's remuneration includes payment in kind in respect of 
accommodation, the provision of food and other basic amenities of life, the employer, at the 
request of the employee, must not discontinue payment in kind during the strike or lock-out; and 
(b) after the end of the strike or lock-out, the employer may recover the monetary value of the 
payment in kind made at the request of the employee during the strike or lock-out from the 
employee by way of civil proceedings instituted in the Labour Court”. 
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party commits an act that is a criminal offence, for instance assault, intimidation, 
malicious damage to property and the like, this protection will be forfeited and the 
party committing the criminal act will be liable for damages.145 
 
3.3.2  PROTECTION AGAINST DISMISSAL 
Probably one of the most meaningful protections afforded to the employees 
participating in a protected strike is found in section 67(4) of the Act.  In fact, this 
section prohibits an employer from dismissing an employee for participating in a 
protected strike or for any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected 
strike.146  The courts have held that a dismissal for any of these reasons is 
automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(a) of the Act, and an award of 
reinstatement and up to 24 months’ salary in compensation may be ordered.147 
 
However, the protections afforded in sections 67(4) and 187(1)(a) of the Act are not 
absolute.  This is because section 67(4) limits the rights of strikers not to be 
dismissed by holding that, despite sections 67(4) and 187(1)(a), an employer may 
fairly dismiss an employee in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII for a 
                                                          
145  Grogan (2007) Workplace Law 396. See also Mondi Ltd (Mondi Kraft Division) v Chemical 
Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union & Others (2005) 26 ILJ 1458 (LC); 
Stuttafords Department Stores Ltd v SA Clothing & Textiles Workers Union (2002) 22 ILJ 414 
(LAC) and Lomati Mill Barbaton v Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union (1997) 18 ILJ 
178 (LC). 
146  For the rationale for protecting strikers against dismissal, see Black Allied Workers Union & 
Others v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel (1993) 14 ILJ 963 (LAC) 972. 
147  See Early Bird Farm (Pty) Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union & Others v and also SA Transport 
& Allied Workers Union v Platinum Miles Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Transition Transport (2008) 
29 ILJ 1742 (LC). 
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reason related to the employee's conduct during the strike,148 or for a reason based 
on the employer's operational requirements.149 
 
3.4  THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNPROTECTED STRIKE IN TERMS OF 
THE ACT 
Employees’ failure to comply with the required procedure and limitations will render 
the strike unprotected.  Accordingly, the employer will have remedies in terms of the 
Act.  The Act provides the employers with the remedies of interdict, compensation for 
loss, and dismissal in instances where employees participate in unprotected strikes. 
 
Usually, in practice most strike cases that go to the Labour Courts commence with 
the employer applying for an interdict contending that the strike is unprotected in one 
way or another.  However, in exceptional instances the trade union approaches the 
court first.  For example, in the Public Service Association decision discussed earlier, 
it was the trade union that approached the Labour Court requesting protection after 
the employer had issued an ultimatum and threatened to dismiss the striking 
workers. 
  
Where a strike does not comply with the provisions of the Act relating to strike, it will 
be unprotected and the following legal consequences will apply:  
                                                          
148  See Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union & others v Metrofile (Pty) 
Ltd (2004) 25 ILJ 231 (LAC) 53; Picardi Hotels Ltd v Food & General Workers Union & others 
(1999) 20 ILJ 1915 (LC) 25; CEPPWAWU & Others /Tugela Mill (a division of SAPPI Kraft (Pty) 
Ltd (2002) 12 BALR 1249 (CCMA); Doorwise SA CC V PPWAWU & others [1997] 6 BLLR 748 
(LC); Morkels Stores (Pty) Ltd v Woolfrey NO & another [1999] 6 BLLR 572 (LC) 6; Adams & 
others v Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 1192 89-90; Mabinana & others v Baldwins 
Steel [1999] 5 BLLR 453 (LAC); NSCAWU & others v Coin Security Group t/a Coin Security 
(1997) 15 ILJ 1257 (A); NUMSA v G Vincent Metal sections (Pty) Ltd [1995] 8 BLLR 85 (IC); 
Chauke & others v Lee Service Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors (1998) 19 ILJ 1441 (LAC); Food 
and Allied Workers Union & others v Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 1552 
(LC); SACTWU & others v Novel Spinners (Pty) Ltd [1999] 11 BLLR 1157 (LC); National Union 
of Metalworkers of SA & others v Atlantis Forge (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 1984 (LC); SACWU v 
Afro Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 62 (LC) and SACCAWU obo Machipa/ Dennis Pizza (2002) 12 BALR 
1356 (CCMA). 
149  National Union of Mineworkers v Black Mountain Mineral Development Co (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 
ILJ 1005 (LAC); Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters 
Hotel (1993) 14 ILJ 963 (LAC) 972F; Cobra Watertech v National Union of Metalworkers SA 
(1995) 16 ILJ 607 (LAC) 616A; General Food Idustries Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union 
(2004) 25 ILJ 1260 (LAC); SA Chemicals Workers Union & other v Afrof Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 1718 
(LAC); National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Dorbyl & another (2007) 28 ILJ 1585 
(LAC); BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union (2001) 22 ILJ 2264 
(LAC) 19; SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union v Discreto (1998) 19 ILJ 1451 (LAC) 8 and 
Northern Cape Allied Workers Union obo Sethlogo & others v CCMA & others (2009) 30 ILJ 
1299 (LC). 
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3.4.1  INTERDICT  
Under the 1956 Act, the Industrial Court was empowered to grant interdicts with 
respect to unlawful industrial action.150  Strike that did not comply with the 
requirements of the 1956 Act regulating strikes was deemed illegal and carried 
criminal consequences.  Now section 68(1) the Act gives the Labour Court exclusive 
jurisdiction to grant an interdict restraining any person from participating in a strike or 
any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike if the strike does not 
comply with the provisions of the Act.  Failure to comply with such an interdict or 
order is a factor which the Labour Court may take into account in ordering just and 
equitable compensation.  
 
The Labour Court may not grant or restraining order unless 48 hours’ notice has 
been granted to the respondent.  A shorter notice period may be permitted if a party 
shows a good cause and if a union has been given a written notice of the application 
and has been allowed a reasonable opportunity to be heard.151  In New Tyre 
Manufacturers Employers Association v National Union of Metalworkers of SA152 and 
Automobile Manufacturers Employers Association v NUMSA,153 the Labour Court 
held that good cause will have to be established on grounds equivalent to those in 
urgent applications.154  Grogan observes that if it is established that the employer has 
made insufficient attempts to serve the notice of the application to each strikers, the 
court will not grant an interdict.155 
 
  
                                                          
150  S 17(11)(b) of Act 28 of 1956. 
151  S 68(2)(a) to (c) of the Act. See also Grogan Workplace Law (2007) 404. 
152  (1999) 20 ILJ 189 (LC). 
153  [1998] 11 BLLR (LC). 
154  These grounds include; the establishment of a prima facie right to the relief sought; a well-
grounded appreciation of irreparable harm to the applicant if the relief sought is not granted; and 
finally is that the applicant has no other satisfactory remedy. 
155  Grogan Workplace Law 404. See also Makhado Municipality v SA Municipal Workers Union & 
others (2006) 27 ILJ 1175 (LC); Woolworth (Pty) Ltd v SA Commercial Catering & Allied 
Workers Union (2006) 27 ILJ 1234 (LC) and Security Services Employer Organisation & others 
v SA Transport Workers Union & others (2006) 27 ILJ 1217 (LC). 
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3.4.2  COMPENSATION  
In addition to granting of an interdict, section 68(1)(b) of the Act, grants the Labour 
Court the jurisdiction to order the payment of just and equitable compensation for any 
loss attributable to an unprotected strike.  
 
In deciding whether the order of the payment of compensation is just and equitable 
the Labour Court must have regard to section 68(1)(b)(i) of the Act.  These are: 
 
 whether attempts were made to comply with Chapter IV of the Act and the 
extent of those attempts;  
 whether the strike was premeditated;  
 whether the strike was in response to an unjustified conduct by the other party 
to the dispute;  
 the duration of the strike;  
 the financial position of the employer, trade union, or employees.  
 
In practice, employers have not resorted to section 68(1) as often as might have 
been expected.  Nevertheless, the first case calling for the application of section 
68(1) came about in Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Mouthpiece Workers Union.156 
In this case, the employee had initially applied for compensation in the amount just 
more than R15 million, emanating from a loss of production and profits following a 
series of unprotected strikes, but subsequently limited its claim to R100 000. 
Although noting that the financial position of the union was weak, the court ordered it 
to pay the full amount claimed. The court mentioned that the amount of R100 000 fell 
well within the upper limit of what it would consider fair, and ordered the R100 000 be 
paid in monthly instalments of R5 000. 
 
3.4.3  THE DISMISSAL OF STRIKERS 
Participation in an unprotected strike may in terms of section 68(5) of the Act 
constitute a fair reason for dismissal.  In deciding whether a dismissal was fair the 
                                                          
156  (2001) 22 ILJ 2035 (LC). See also Algoa Bus Company v SATAWU & others [2010] 2 BLLR 149 
(LC); Mangaung Local Municipality v SA Municipal Workers Union (2003) 24 ILJ 405 (LC); 
Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v FAWU & others (2001) 22 ILJ 1103 (LAC) and Columbus Joint 
Venture t/a Columbus Stainless Steel v NUMSA (1998) 19 ILJ 279 (LC).  
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provisions of the Code of Good Practice dealing with dismissals, as contained in 
schedule 8 of the Act, must be taken into account.  Item 6 of the Code of Good 
Practice states clearly that participation in an unprotected strike constitutes 
misconduct.  However, the Code also states that as in the case with any other act of 
misconduct participation in an unprotected strike does not necessarily justify 
dismissal.  For a dismissal to be fair, such dismissal must be substantively and 
procedurally fair.  
 
 Substantive fairness 
It does not follow as a matter of course that the dismissal of strikers who participated 
in an unprotected strike is fair.  The substantive fairness of such a dismissal depends 
on all the circumstances surrounding the strike.  Item 6 of the Code of Good Practice 
requires that the substantive fairness of the dismissal of strikers who participated in 
an unprotected strike must be evaluated in the light of the facts of the case.  Item 6 of 
the Code as well as court decisions157 requires that the following factors must be 
taken into account: 
 
 The seriousness of the failure to comply with the provisions of the Act 
pertaining to protected strike. 
 
 The attempts made by the employees to comply with the Act.  For instance a 
genuine attempt to issue a 48 hours’ strike notice, but a defective formulation 
of the notice makes it impossible for the employer to know when the strike will 
commence.158  
 
 Whether or not the strike was in response to unjustified conduct on the part of 
the employer.  For instance, in National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others 
v Pro Roof Cape (Pty) Ltd,159 the Labour Court noted that the employer’s 
                                                          
157  See Liberty Box & Bag Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd v Paper Wood & Allied Workers Union 
(1990) 11 ILJ 427 (ARB); Doornfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers of 
SA & others (1994) 15 ILJ 527 (LAC); Henred Fruehauf Trailers (Pty) Ltd v National Union of 
Mineworkers of SA & others (1992) 13 ILJ 593 (LAC) and Performing Arts Council v Paper 
Wood & Allied Workers Union (1992) 13 ILJ 1439 (LAC). 
158  Adams & others v Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ 924 (LAC). 
159  (2005) 26 ILJ 1705 (LC). 
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provocative conduct by, amongst other things, not paying a bonus due to the 
employees, meant that the dismissal was unfair. 
 
Besides the above requirements, the courts have held that, where the employees 
during the course of the strike engage in unacceptable conduct and as a result the 
employer suffers harm, they may be dismissed fairly.160 
 
 Procedural fairness  
The dismissal of strikers who have embarked on an unprotected strike will also have 
to be procedurally fair.  Investigation should take place as soon as possible.  
Procedural fairness rests on the following pillars:  
. 
 This does not need to be a formal investigation or a formal disciplinary hearing 
or enquiry.  However, in Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v 
CCMA161 the Labour Court noted that the code specifically states that the 
investigation preceding a dismissal “need not be a formal inquiry”.  The Code 
requires no more than that before dismissing an employee, the employer 
should conduct an investigation, give the employee or his/her representative 
an opportunity to respond to the allegation after a reasonable period, take a 
decision and give the employee notice of that decision.  This approach 
represents a significant change from what may be termed the “criminal-justice” 
model developed by the erstwhile Industrial Court under the 1956 Act. 
 
 The employer should then notify the employee of the allegations, using a form 
and language that the employee can reasonably understand.  This notice 
should set out the charges and the employee's rights during the hearing. 
 
 The charges should be detailed enough for the employee to determine the 
charge and to be able to defend himself/herself against it. 
 
                                                          
160  National Union of Furniture & Allied Workers of SA v New Era Products (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 
869 (LC); National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Pro Roof Cape (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 
ILJ 1705 (LC) and National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Atlantis Forge (Pty) Ltd 
(2005) 26 ILJ 1984 (LC). 
161  [2006] 9 BLLR 833 (LC). 
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 The employee is entitled to a reasonable time (at least 2 clear working days) 
to prepare his defence; and the employee is entitled to the assistance of a 
trade-union representative or a fellow employee. 
 
 The employee is entitled to be present during a hearing and to present his 
defence by cross-questioning the employer's witnesses, presenting his own 
evidence and by stating his own defence.  This constitutes the core rights of 
an employee when suspected of misconduct (audi alterem partem). 
 
 If the employee is found guilty, the employee has the right to present 
mitigating circumstances before a sanction is given. 
 
 After the enquiry, the employer should communicate the decision taken to the 
employee and preferably furnish the employee with written notification of that 
decision. 
 
If the employee is dismissed, the employee should be given the reason for dismissal 
and reminded of any rights to refer the matter to a council with jurisdiction or to the 
Commission or to any dispute-resolution procedures established in terms of a 
collective agreement. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
As noted above, the legal mechanism aimed at further limiting the scope of the right 
to strike has recently become a highly contested issue, particularly among trade 
unions. 
 
As the law currently stands, section 65(1)(c) of the Act holds that no person may take 
part in a strike if the issue in dispute is one that a party may refer to arbitration or to 
the Labour Court in terms of the Act.  This has become a well-established and 
accepted limitation in our labour law for years. 
 
Now the proposed amendment to section 65(1)(c) of the Act seeks to further limit the 
right to strike by excluding this right in circumstances where the issue in dispute is 
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one that could be referred to arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms of the Act, or 
in terms of any other employment law. 
 
Although this amendment is to be appreciated for its aim, which is to try and address 
the increasing levels of unprotected strikes, this extension to further limit the scope of 
the right to strike creates an unnecessary hurdle to employees wishing to exercise 
their constitutional right to strike.  Therefore this amendment should be revisited for 
the simple reason that the right to resort to strike action is a pivotal tool for trade 
unions to balance the relationship between management and the workforce.   
 
The consequences of protected and unprotected strike were also elaborated in this 
chapter.  
 
On the one hand, it was found that, although the right to strike is recognised under 
the laws of South Africa, section 68 of the Act explicitly provides for the 
consequences of a strike action embarked upon against the spirit and purport of the 
law and particularly the Act and the Constitution.  In other words, the law provides the 
employers with the remedies of interdict, compensation for loss and dismissal (only if 
it is procedurally and substantively fair) against an unprotected strike.  On the other 
hand, it was established that the consequences of a protected strike are well 
articulated in section 67 of the Act, and include immunity from civil liability and breach 
of contract as well as protection against dismissal. 
  
 52 
CHAPTER 4 
FURTHER LIMITATION ON THE EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO STRIKE v 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR THE PURPOSES OF REACHING A 
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT: STRIKING A BALANCE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION  
Thus far we have been concerned with the various limitations imposed on the 
employees’ constitutional right to strike.  In this chapter we turn to an area in our law 
which is no less important in practice.  More importantly, the chapter attempts to 
establish whether the further limitations proposed in the amendments to the LRA on 
the employees’ right to strike are indeed necessary as compared to rather engaging 
in a meaningful collective bargaining with the objective of reaching and concluding a 
collective agreement. 
 
The statutory mechanisms for institutionalization of conflict through the medium of 
collective bargaining made its appearance in South African Labour Law in the early 
1920s.162  Despite the provision of a legislative framework for collective bargaining, 
there was still an underlying philosophy of voluntarism underpinning the legislation.163  
The voluntarism took the form of the employer and employee parties being able to 
freely regulate their relationship.  The role of the State was to encourage collective 
bargaining by providing the framework for it. In 1979 the Wiehahn Commission 
Report stated that the role of the State was limited to setting the broad framework 
within which the employer and employee should have the maximum degree of 
freedom to regulate their various relationships.164 
 
In the last few months, South Africa has experienced a most escalating wave of 
strikes in history.  As a result, South Africa has been dubbed “the protest capital of 
                                                          
162  Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. 
163  Davis Voluntarism and South African Labour Law (1990) 45 50. 
164  Wiehahn Commission Report Part V par 4.11.5. 
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the world”.165  Arguably, no day goes by in South Africa without strikes or employees 
from different sectors threatening to go on strike.  If left unattended, this wave of 
development will soon have dire consequences for South Africa, a country that is 
already experiencing a fragile economy.  South Africa’s desire to encourage foreign 
investments will be seriously endangered since no serious foreign investor will be 
willing to invest in a country constantly faced with vicious strikes indicating a nose-
diving economy.166  A good example is the five-month long platinum strike that 
almost pushed the economy to the brink of recession in the first half of this year.167  
 
Strikes may be detrimental for a number of reasons.  In their very nature they are 
calculated to harm not only the employer but also the employer’s customers and 
suppliers and even non-striking employees.168  Strike action has also been viewed as 
unjust since it causes inconvenience and perhaps hardship to the general public, and 
under some circumstances may be injurious to the entire economy.  Strikes often 
inflict serious economic loss, not only upon the employer and the individual 
employees engaged in the activity, but it also stirs up hate and disrupts the solidarity 
of the community at large.169  The right to strike is, nevertheless, an indispensable 
element of the right to bargain collectively. It represents the power which, even if not 
used, constitutes the foundation of the union's bargaining position.170  Any undue 
limitation of the right involves the danger of weakening the very basis of collective 
bargaining.  It is for these reasons that perhaps collective bargaining needs to 
                                                          
165  Rodrigues “‘Black Boers’ and other revolutionary songs” 5 April 2010. 
http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/chrisrodrigues/2010/04/05/on-revolutionary-songs/ (Accessed 
2014-03-12). 
166  http://ewn.mobi/2014/08/10/numsa-vows-to-fight-for-right-to-strike. see also 
http://m.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sacci-calls-for-introduction-of-strike-limitations-following-
violence-2014-06-11.  
167  Stephen Grootes “End of South Africa's platinum mine strike signals end of ANC domination” 25 
June 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/25/south-africa-platinum-miners-strike-
anc. (Accessed 2014-03-12). See also Solomons, I. (2014). Platinum strike consequences 
starting to take shape. Available at: http://www.miningweekly.com/article/platinum-strike-
consequences-starting-to-take-shape-2014-08-22 [accessed on 21 October 2014]. 
168  Grogan Collective Labour Law (2010) 142. 
169  Hobson “The Conditions of Industrial Peace” cited in Cockar, “The Industrial Court and Labour 
Relations in Kenya” 1996 2 East African Law Journal 257 258.  
170  “…the threat to strike, and the strike itself, are the prods which stimulate management and 
unions to find a peaceful solution to the problems of employment. Indeed, the strike is an 
integral part of the collective bargaining process. Without it, collective bargaining cannot 
function effectively as the vehicle of joint determination of the issues of the employment 
relationship." Witney Government and Collective Bargaining (1951) 3. 
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develop effective strike avoidance strategies in order to encourage industrial peace in 
labour relations. 
 
4.2  THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE RIGHT TO 
STRIKE 
At the heart of any industrial-relations system, lies the concept of collective 
bargaining.  As legal scholar, Tucker, has noted that this notion has a very long 
history, which he traces back as far as 1921, being popularised in the 1940s.171 
 
For employers, the motivation behind collective bargaining is to maintain industrial 
peace and for employees, it is a motivational force to sustain “certain standards of 
distribution of work, of rewards and of stability of employment”.172  Interesting to note 
is that “It is one of the ironies of collective bargaining that its very object, industrial 
peace, should depend on the threat of conflict.”   
 
In South Africa collective bargaining has particular importance with its legacy, deeply 
ingrained in the South African history.  The current legislative framework allows for a 
voluntary system of collective bargaining backed by the freedom of parties to resort 
to coercive power.  It is the mechanism through which regulated flexibility is 
achieved. In other words, the ability of collective bargaining to set wages and 
conditions that balance employees’ needs with those of employers is essential for 
development of a new labour-relations structure to balance the imperatives of equity 
and economic development. 
 
Collective bargaining is a “process by which employers and organised groups of 
employees seek to reconcile their conflicting interests and goals through mutual 
understanding”.173  Its main objective is to reach a mutually acceptable agreement 
through compromises or negotiations made by both parties on matters of joint 
                                                          
171  Tucker, “Can Worker Voice Strike Back?” in Bogg and Novitz Voices at Work: Continuity and 
Change in the Common Law World (Oxford, OUP, 2014, forthcoming) 6. 
172  Davies & Freedland in Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law’ (1983) 69. 
173  Grogan Collective Labour Law 86. The author also states that “the central objective of all 
modern industrial relations legislation is to promote collective bargaining as a means of 
regulating relations between employers and employees and for resolving disputes between 
them”. 
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interest.174  Du Toit observes that the LRA attempts to advance collective bargaining 
as a means of securing labour peace, social justice, economic development and 
employee equality.  He also notes that collective bargaining is not only concerned 
with securing an agreement over wages or conditions, it maintains labour peace, 
promotes equality and plays a social and economic role.175  For that reason, if the 
legislative framework is to provide a sustainable and lasting foundation for 
encouraging mutually beneficial relations, it must strike a fair balance between 
employees’ and employers’ interests and also encourage more voluntary collective 
bargaining.  Unnecessary lobbying of the legislative framework which allows the 
power balance to tip heavily towards either employers or employees may hinder the 
fundamental compromises and self-determination which are the essential 
foundations of effective bargaining but will also undermine the development of 
mature, cooperative relationships. 
 
The nature and extent of the right to engage in collective bargaining were extensively 
dealt with in the popular cases of South African National Defence Union v Minister of 
Defence,176 SANDU v Minister of Defence177 and Minister of Defence v SANDU.178  It 
is not the intention of this study to discuss these cases in detail.  Nevertheless, it is 
worth mentioning that the most common core issue in all the cases was whether the 
South African National Defence Force179 had a justifiable duty to engage in collective 
bargaining with the South African National Defence Union,180 a union set up by and 
comprising members of the defence force, which allowed them to function as a union 
by the decision of the Constitutional Court.  
 
                                                          
174  Bendix The Basics of Labour Relations (2000) 138. See also Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law 
(1977) 5 who similarly explains the purpose of collective bargaining as follows; “[B]y bargaining 
collectively with organised labour, management seeks to give effect to its legitimate 
expectations that the planning of production, distribution … should not be frustrated through 
interruptions of work. By bargaining collectively with management, organised labour seeks to 
give effect to its legitimate expectations that wages and other conditions of work should be such 
as to guarantee a stable and adequate form of existence and as to be compatible with the 
physical integrity and moral dignity of the individual, and also that jobs should be reasonably 
secure.” 
175  Du Toit Labour Relations Law A Comprehensive Guide (2000) 123. 
176  (2003) 3 SA 239 (T). Hereinafter referred to as SANDU 1. 
177  (2004) 4 SA 10 (T) Hereinafter referred to as SANDU 2. 
178  (2007) 1 SA 422 (SCA) Hereinafter referred to as SANDU 3. 
179  Hereinafter referred to as SANDF. 
180  Hereinafter referred to as SANDU. 
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The Constitutional Court held that the constitutional right of workers to engage in 
collective bargaining imposes a correlative obligation on employers to bargain with 
unions which have the right to bargain.  In this case, the court held that soldiers could 
be classified as similar to employees and therefore “workers” for the purposes of 
section 23 of the Constitution.  The provision of the Defence Act and its regulations 
that prohibited soldiers from belonging to trade unions were held to be 
unconstitutional and were therefore declared invalid.  After some acrimony, an order 
was requested compelling the SANDF to bargain with the union.  The application was 
dismissed.  The court held that, although section 23(5) of the Constitution grants 
trade unions the right to engage in collective bargaining or the freedom to bargain 
collectively, it does not impose an obligation to bargain on the other side.  
 
In another Constitutional court judgment, In re Certification of the Constitution of 
South Africa181 the court found that: 
 
“Collective bargaining is based on the recognition of the fact that employers 
enjoy greater social and economic power than individual workers. Workers 
therefore need to act in concert to provide them collectively with sufficient power 
to bargaining effectively with employers. Workers exercise collective power 
primarily through the mechanism of strike action.” 
 
In other foreign jurisdictions, for instance the UK,  in 1942, the House of Lords in 
Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed v Veitchheld182 held that the “right of  employees 
to strike is an essential element in the principle of collective bargaining”.  In Canada, 
the Supreme Court has held in Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector 
Bargaining Association v British Columbia that: 
 
“… to take away an employee’s ability to strike so seriously detracts from the 
benefits of the right to organize and bargain collectively as to make those rights 
virtually meaningless.”183 
 
4.3 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER THE ILO 
The primary goal of the ILO under its Constitution is “social justice”, which is to take 
precedence over other economic goals.184  It is imperative to point out that the ILO 
                                                          
181  (1996) 4 SA 744 par 66. 
182  [1942] AC 43 Lord Wright p 463. 
183  [2007] 2 SCR 391.  
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Constitution that provides for social justice involves the improvement of conditions of 
work and the ability of workers to participate in making the decisions which affect 
their working lives, either by means of collective bargaining or tripartite (Government, 
employer and worker representatives) consultation.  
 
It must be emphasised that the ILO describes collective bargaining as a process in 
which workers and employers make claims upon each other and resolve them 
through a process of negotiations leading to collective agreements that are mutually 
beneficial.  In fact, under most of the international legislative framework, it is 
regarded as a labour right.  For example employees, joining together, allow them to 
have a more balanced relationship with their employer.  It also provides a mechanism 
for negotiating a fair share of the results of their work, with due respect for the 
financial position of the enterprise or public service in which they are employed. In 
the process, different interests are reconciled.  For employers, free association 
enables firms to ensure that competition is constructive, fair and based on a 
collaborative effort to raise productivity and conditions of work.185 
 
The ILO is viewed as the pre-eminent authority or bench mark on international labour 
standards.  This organisation considers the right to collective bargaining as one of 
the core rights that is essential to the ILO’s mission.  The significance of this right has 
been acknowledged by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association through 
Conventions and Recommendations.  In 1960 the Committee declared that: 
 
“The right to bargain freely with employees with respect to conditions of work 
constitutes an essential element in freedom of association, and trade unions 
should have the right, through collective bargaining or other lawful means to 
seek to improve the living and working conditions of those whom the trade 
unions represent and public authorities should refrain from any interference 
which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof.”   
 
Even way back before 1960, the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia which is now part 
of the ILO Constitution, had already acknowledged the role of the ILO in the 
promotion of collective bargaining.  The Declaration affirmed “the solemn obligation 
of the International Labour Organisation to further among the nations of the world 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
184  See Preamble to Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles 1919 and Declaration of Philadelphia 1944, 
Article II (c). 
185  Van Niekerk et al Law at Work (2008) 341. 
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programmes which will achieve the effective recognition of the right of collective 
bargaining”.186 
 
In the years that followed, particularly in 1949, the ILO Convention 98 on the Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining was adopted and to date it remains the main 
source of employees’ right to collective bargaining.  Apart from Convention 98, there 
are numerous other Conventions and Recommendations which promote collective 
bargaining between employees and their employers, such as Convention No. 154 
Collective Bargaining Convention 1981, Convention No 135 Workers’ Representative 
Convention 1971 and Convention No 151 on the right of public employees to 
organise.187 
 
4.4 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LRA 
FRAMEWORK 
As noted earlier, the right to strike for the purposes of collective bargaining is one of 
the cardinal rights protected in section 23(5) of the Constitution.  The Constitutional 
Court also confirmed the importance of collective bargaining in the case of Numsa v 
Bader Bop.188  The court held that 
 
“... it is through industrial action that workers are able to assert bargaining 
power in industrial relations. The right to strike is an important component of a 
successful collective bargaining system”. 
 
Actually, the right to strike is the only basic human right that “forces” others to do 
what they wish not to do, through an expression of a collective voice of employees.189  
 
                                                          
186  ILO: Constitution of the International Labour Organisation and Standing Orders of the 
International Labour Conference Geneva (1998) 23 24. 
187  See also Recommendation 91: Collective Agreements Recommendation 1951, 
Recommendation 92: Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation 1951, 
Recommendation 94: Co-operation at the Level of the Undertaking Recommendation 1952, 
Recommendation 113: Consultation (Industrial and National Levels) Recommendation 1960, 
Recommendation 130: Examination of Grievances Recommendation 1967, Recommendation 
143: Workers’ Representatives Recommendation 1971, Recommendation 163: Collective 
Bargaining Recommendation 1981, Recommendation 129: Communication within the 
Undertaking Recommendation 1967 and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 1976; 
revised in 2000. 
188  (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC). The court also said that “section 23 of the Constitution recognizes the 
importance of ensuring fair labour relations.  
189  Mc Farlane The Right to Strike (1981) 184. 
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Notably, the LRA removed the duty to bargain collectively which the Industrial Court 
earlier imposed on contending parties in the exercise of its unfair labour-practice 
jurisdiction.  This means that an employer is at liberty to refuse to engage with a 
trade union and in turn, the trade union may exercise its right to strike in respect of 
such a refusal to bargain.  However, by extending and bolstering the right to strike, 
the legislature has effectively empowered unions to have recourse to the strike as an 
integral aspect of the collective bargaining process.   
 
Interesting to note, is that the relationship between the right to strike and collective 
bargaining dates back years ago before the adoption of both the Constitution and the 
LRA.190  It is a right that is extremely important for collective bargaining to function 
effectively in maintaining industrial peace.191  Budeli observes that the employees’ 
right to strike is a key component of their right to freedom of association, and one of 
the weapons wielded by trade unions when collective bargaining fails.192  It therefore 
remains a powerful tool in the hands of workers to persuade their employer to 
bargain collectively. 
 
Similarly, the right to freedom of association would remain ineffective if the right to 
bargain collectively and to strike were not well recognised.193  Grogan equates “the 
relationship between collective bargaining and industrial action much like the 
relationship between war and diplomacy”.194  Bendix opines that it is the central 
process emanating from the conduct of a collective labour relationship.195  
                                                          
190  See Food & Allied Workers Union v Spekenham Supreme (2) (1988) 9 ILJ 628 (IC); See also 
National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd (1991) 12 ILJ 1221 (A) 
1237  1238. 
191  Brand Strike Avoidance – How to Develop an Effective Strike Avoidance Strategy 23rd Annual 
Labour Law Conference, Johannesburg (August 2010) 1. 
192  Budeli “Understanding the right to freedom of association at the workplace: its components and 
scope” 2010 31 Obiter 27 28. 
193  Olivier ‘Statutory employment relations in South Africa’ in Slabbert et al managing employment 
relations in South Africa (1991) 5 61. 
194  Grogan Collective Labour Law (2010) 141. The author also states that “collective bargaining in 
the employment arena is much the same as bargaining that takes place in other spheres of life”. 
See also Basson et al Essential Labour Law 276 277 where Basson define collective bargaining 
as a process through which one or more trade unions engage in negotiations which one or more 
employers or one or more employers’ organisations with the purpose of regulating terms and 
conditions of employment or matters of mutual interest. Fourie and Olivier Principle of Labour 
Law (2004) 533 defines collective bargaining as “a voluntary process by means of which 
employees in an organised relationship, with regard to employment conditions or disputes 
arising therefrom with the object of reaching an agreement on these matters.”   
195  Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa (1989) 76. 
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Further, in the South African context, the right to strike is an integral part of collective 
bargaining and freedom of association in pursuit of common cause for the betterment 
of the members of the striking employees, non-striking employees and the 
employers. 
 
While strike may be used for trade negotiation, collective bargaining offers a better 
solution and it is also the right of the employees to bargain collectively.  This is tacitly 
recognised in the LRA and constitutionally approved in 1996 in South Africa.  The 
right to collective bargaining and, by implication, including the right to strike are 
guaranteed under the ILO and other international instruments.196  In effect, collective-
bargained agreements often involve transformation. Transformation works best when 
both sides agree to the future direction.  That is the reason why collective bargaining 
is so appropriate to organizations undergoing change.  An imposed change can be 
resisted and undermined in subtle but corrosive ways by those who feel that change 
was imposed without their consent.197 
 
Unlike the 1956 LRA which contained a provision for a duty to collective bargaining, 
the current LRA retained a voluntarist approach to bargaining in which the parties 
would determine their own bargaining arrangements through the exercise of 
power.198  The removal of the duty to bargaining was balanced by the introduction of 
a set of organisational rights in chapter III of the LRA, and the concerted promotion of 
collective bargaining, particularly at the sectoral level.  Underpinning collective 
bargaining is a protected right to strike that is given to unions that follow the statutory 
procedure. 
 
The significance of this right was recognized in South Africa even before the 
enactment of the Interim and final Constitutions as well as the LRA.  The old 
Industrial Court in giving content to unfair labour practices, held that the right to 
bargain collectively existed in South African labour law.  Whether or not the right to 
                                                          
196  Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa (2010) 24. 
197  Task Force to Review Part I of the Canadian Labour Code,Seeking a Balance: Review of the 
Canada Labour Code Part 1, 1995, Chapter 1, http://www110.hrdc.gc.ca/sfmc_fmcs/ 
lcctr_tclcr/ondex_e.html. (Accessed 9 August 2014. 
198  Van Jaarsveld Principles of Labour Law (2005) 791. 
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engage in collective bargaining entails within it a corresponding duty to bargain which 
is legally enforceable remains a question this study seeks to answer. 
 
4.5 THE NEXUS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL 
ACTION 
The right to collective bargaining is closely related to the right to strike.  It may not be 
effective without a reliable threat of a strike.  In effect, strikes and collective 
bargaining help to redistribute the unequal power between the parties.  Employees 
use economic pressure through strikes in order to strike a balance in the unequal 
bargaining powers between an employer and an employee.  This in return enhances 
social justice in the workplace.  Collective bargaining between the employees’ union 
and the employer deals with the terms and conditions under which labour will be 
supplied by employees and purchased by employers.  Since the employers have 
both powers and rights in law and practice over property and capital, they are able 
through collective bargaining to propose the terms upon which they will purchase 
labour for its operations.  In turn, if there is a failure to collectively agree, the 
employees have the collective right to withdraw their labour rather than to accept the 
employer’s offer. 
 
As a consequence, a strike initiated by a union will inevitably affect both sides.  The 
employer’s operation may be shut down with the attendant loss of revenue, and the 
employees will suffer hardship because they will be out of work and will be deprived 
of their salaries and wages.  The workers resort to industrial action in order to force 
the employer to reach a mutually acceptable agreement about the terms and 
conditions of employment.  In this sense the economic purpose of strike action plays 
an important role in collective bargaining.199  Therefore any attempt to limit this right 
further as proposed in the amendment Bill is indeed taking away the employees’ 
fundamental right to strike guaranteed by the Constitution.  It is considered as one of 
the necessary conditions for collective bargaining to exist as it was built into the 
bargaining process.200 
 
                                                          
199  Ben-Israel International Labour Standards: the Case of the Freedom to Strike (1987) I. 
200  Myburg “100 Years of Strike Law” 2004 25 ILJ 966. 
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Additionally, the right to strike is not only a logical step in the collective-bargaining 
system but is also part of the price paid for industrial self-regulation of conditions of 
employment.  Particularly, it forms an integral part of the process toward securing 
adjustment of expectations of economic realities.  The ILO’s Committee on Freedom 
of Association maintains that “the right to strike is one of the essential means through 
which workers and their organizations may promote and defend their economic and 
social interests”.201 
 
Today the right to strike is essential to a democratic society, so one might justifiably 
wonder why this constitutional right should be limited even further. 
 
There can be little doubt that the right to strike is an integral part of any system of 
collective bargaining in order to guarantee the economic right of employees.202  A 
denial of this right would lead to an enormous weakening of the bargaining power of 
employees as they cannot equally match the strength of management in the 
inevitable conflict of interests between the parties.  The right to strike will allow the 
employees more power to meet the needs of maintaining equilibrium in industrial 
relations.  Kahn-Freund has expressed a similar view when he said that: 
 
“In the context of the use of the strike as a sanction in industrial relations, the 
equilibrium argument is the most important… the concentrated power of 
accumulated capital can only be matched by the concentrated power of the 
workers acting in solidarity.”203 
 
                                                          
201  See fn 23 of ch 1. See also the Committee on Freedom of Association, Digest 522. See also 
Grogan “Labour Law/ Employment Law Journal/ 2013/ April/ Strike notices What must they 
contain?” where Grogan indicates that employees use the right to strike as a weapon to prove 
to the employer that resisting to accepts their demands could be fatal and costly than acceding 
to them. See also FGWU v Minister of Safety & Security 1999 ILJ 1258 (LC) 1264 par 18 and 
CEPPWAWU v Metrofile (Pty) Ltd 2004 ILJ 231 (LAC) 246 par 53. 
202  Patel (ed) Workers Rights: From Apartheid to Democracy -What Role for Organised Labour 
(1994) 22. 
203  Kahn-Freud and Hepple Laws against Strikes (1972) 5. Grunfeld noted that “…if one set of 
human beings is placed in a position of unchecked industrial authority over another set, to 
expect the former to keep the interest of the latter constantly in mind and, for example, to 
increase the latter’s earnings as soon as the surplus income is available…is to place on human 
nature a strain it was never designed to bear” 52. See Grunfeld, Modern Trade Union Law 
(1966) 33. 
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The right to strike is the only or if not one of the reasonable weapons which 
strengthen the power of the employees at the bargaining table.204  And if employees 
could not, in the last resort, collectively refuse to work, they could not bargain 
collectively.205  It is therefore called for in order to achieve a collective agreement. 
Certainly, bargaining without the right to strike would be no more than “collective 
begging”.206  
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the right to strike and collective bargaining.  It may be 
argued that strikes damage economic performance, reduce living standards and 
destroy jobs, and therefore limitations on the constitutional right to strike are needed.  
However, this right remains an important instrument in resolving conflicts of interest.  
In particular, it can force a party who is refusing to negotiate, to join the negotiating 
table.  
 
This chapter finds that, rather than further limiting an already over-limited right to 
strike, a peaceful resolution of industrial disputes through rational discussion and 
exchange of views should be regarded as the preferred means of settling work 
related disputes.  If not, South Africa could be heading in the direction of the United 
Kingdom where no right to strike exists.  Actually, a recent decision of the UK Court 
of Appeal in Metrobus Ltd v Unite the Union207 shows that the right to strike is simply 
a legal metaphor, and that a strike by employees (for whatever reason) will typically 
constitute a breach of contract by the employees involved and give rise to liability on 
                                                          
204  Lending support to necessity of the right to strike in collective bargaining, Lord Wedderburn of 
Charlton further rationalised: “To protect such a right is not to approve or disapprove of its 
exercise in any particular withdrawal of labour, it is to recognise the fact that the limits set to the 
right to strike and to lockout are one measure of the strength which each party can in the last 
resort bring to bear at the bargaining table. The strength of a union is bound to be related to its 
power and its right to call out its members, so long as any semblance of collective bargaining 
survives.” See Wedderburn The Worker and the Law (1986) 245. 
205  Kahn-Freud Labour and the Law 292. 
206  See Jacobs “The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs” in Blanpain and Engels (eds) Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (1993) 423. Perrins 
asserts that it is an arguable question whether industrial action should be allowed only as a last 
resort and whether collective bargaining is the best means of settling terms and conditions of 
employment. He however agrees that collective bargaining necessarily involves the freedom to 
take industrial action, see Perrins Trade Union Law (1985) 22. 
207  [2009] EWCA Civ 829. 
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the part of the union for inducing the employees to break their contracts of 
employment. 
 
The role of the State is to create a legal framework within which parties may address 
their labour concerns.  As such, developing effective and stable collective-bargaining 
institutions are proposed.  This can be achieved fairly in the context where the rules 
of the game are specified within a fair and balanced legislative structure.  The 
chapter has also looked at the position of the ILO, the Constitution and the LRA with 
regards to collective bargaining.  Whether this is what the proposed amendments’ 
limitations intend, remains to be seen.  It is vital that the LRA properly reflects the 
intentions of the Constitution, particularly in relation to employees’ and trade unions’ 
right to strike. 
 
The overwhelming conclusion in this chapter is that the legislative framework that 
finds an appropriate balance between employees, employer and broader social 
interests, as far as the regulation of strike is concerned, is an effective collective-
bargaining process instead of having a more complex and onerous set of provisions 
that are designed to impede and impair access to a right to strike. 
 
In reviewing and revising these provisions it is essential that policy makers have 
regard to the requirements of stable, voluntary collective-bargaining systems.  There 
is a need to strike a fair balance between the interests of employers and employees 
in order to avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens and complexity in accessing the 
employees’ constitutional right to strike.  In this case, the conventions, established by 
the ILO through its tripartite processes, and the principles, established by its 
supervisory bodies in interpreting the application of those conventions, could provide 
useful guidance in establishing a stable, lasting foundation for encouraging mutually 
beneficial and cooperative relations.  In fact, the ILO has indicated that research 
shows that countries with highly-coordinated collective bargaining tend to have less 
wage inequality, lower unemployment and fewer and shorter strikes than countries 
where collective bargaining is less established.208  
                                                          
208  International Labour Organisation “Collective bargaining” available at 
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-
standards/collective-bargaining/lang--en/index.htm.  (Accessed on 23 October 2014. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IS THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN TERMS OF THE LRA TOO LIMITED? 
SOUTH AFRICA’S POSITION IS COMPARED TO THE ILO’S 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter 4 reference was made to the importance of developing structures that 
support a meaningful collective-bargaining system as an alternative to further limiting 
the right to strike.  Importantly, the chapter established that the LRA views collective 
bargaining as a preferred method of resolving labour disputes.  This chapter 
compares the South African position regarding the legal protection of the right to 
strike to that of the ILO’s jurisprudence. 
  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) represents a specialized organization of 
the United Nations that has a special place in shaping labour in general 
internationally.  South Africa became a member state to the ILO in 1919 but withdrew 
in 1966 due to the impact of the apartheid regime at the time.  Subsequently, 
following the democratic dispensation in 1994, South Africa resumed its 
membership.209  Because South Africa is a member state of the ILO, it is important to 
test the provisions of the LRA against the principles developed by the ILO’s bodies.  
In fact, one of the primary reasons why the LRA was enacted is to give effect to the 
obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the ILO.210  Similarly, 
section 39 of the Constitution makes it peremptory for a court to take international 
laws into account and the way courts in other countries have decided on similar 
cases.  
 
A very good example of how the international labour standards have played a pivotal 
role in shaping our labour laws was in the case of National Union of Metalworkers 
                                                          
209  Budeli Freedom of association and trade unionism in South Africa: from Apartheid to the 
democratic constitutional order (LLD Thesis, University of Cape Town 2007) 256. 
210  S1(b) of the LRA. 
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and Others v Baderbop.211  The court held that the conventions ordinarily interpreted, 
afford trade unions the right to recruit members and to represent those members at 
least in workplace grievances and to recognise the right to strike in order to enforce 
collective-bargaining demands.  The jurisprudence of the ILO’s supervisory bodies 
suggested that a reading of the LRA which permitted minority unions the right to 
strike over the issue of shop-steward recognition, would be more in accordance with 
the principles of freedom of association entrenched in international labour standards. 
 
5.2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO STRIKE 
 
5.2.1  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS  
It is remarkable to note that the right to strike has become so important that it has 
been recognised and protected by many member states of the ILO.  This right is 
embodied in some of the significant international human-rights instruments, including: 
 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR of 1948); 
 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR of 1966); and 
 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR 
of 1966).  
 
In order to understand the scope of the right to strike under these instruments, a 
cursory discussion of each will follows. 
 
5.2.1.1 THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The UDHR was adopted by the UN’s General Assembly Resolution 217a(III) in Paris 
on 10 December 1948.  It was adopted for common standards of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations.212  However, the UDHR does not mention the right to strike 
directly.  This right derives indirectly from the right of “everyone to peaceful assembly 
and association”.  It plays a significant role to the ILO by promoting and defending 
human rights. It sets out, for the first time, the fundamental human rights to be 
                                                          
211  [2003] 2 BLLR 103 (CC). See also Basson et al Essential Labour Law 267. Chicktay 
“Democracy, Minority Unions and the Right to Strike: A Critical Analysis Numsa v Bader Bop 
(Pty) Ltd (2003) 2 BCLR (CC)” 2007 28 Obiter 159. 
212  See the preamble of the UDHR. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (Accessed on the 20-9-
2014). 
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universally protected. In effect the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations has emphasised that: 
 
“The Universal Declaration ... is generally accepted as a point of reference for 
human rights throughout the world, and as the basis for most of the standard 
setting that has been carried out in the United Nations and in many other 
organizations since then. ... The ILO’s standards and practical activities on 
human rights are closely related to the universal values laid down in the 
Declaration, ... [T]he ILO’s standards on human rights along with the 
instruments adopted in the UN and in other international organizations give 
practical application to the general expressions of human aspirations made in 
the Universal Declaration, and have translated into binding terms the principles 
of that noble document.”213 
 
Worth noting is that the UDHR is not a treaty and therefore no binding 
obligations arising from it affect the member states.  However, it was felt that its 
adoption would provide an important guideline to all those who strive to raise 
man’s material standards of living.  More importantly, its constant reaffirmation 
in subsequent universal and regional instruments, as well as national 
constitutions, has led to some of its provisions achieving the status of 
customary international law.214  For instance, Article 23, paragraph 4 of the 
UDHR proclaims that:  
 
“Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. This is a more specific manifestation of the right laid down in article 20 
of the Universal Declaration to the right of freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association.” 
 
The right to strike is not expressly protected by the European Convention on Human 
Rights and does not expressly provide for the right to strike.215  However, its Article 
11 provides that:  
 
                                                          
213  ILO: Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations: General report and observations concerning particular countries, Report III 
(Part 1A), International Labour Conference, 86th Session, 1998, Geneva, 16-17, par 56-58. 
214  Manamela and Budeli “Employees’ right to strike and violence in South Africa” 2013 46 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 311.  Waldock “Human rights in 
contemporary international law and the significance of European convention” 1997 11 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 121. See also Dugard 
“International Law: A south African Perspective” 2000 34 Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa 241. 
215  Ewing and Hendy “The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baycara” 2010 39 ILJ 2. 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (Accessed 0-10-2014). 
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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for 
the protection of his/her interests. 
 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.  This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful 
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of 
the police or of the administration of the State. 
 
5.2.1.2 THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
(ICCPR) 
South Africa ratified the ICCPR in December 1998 and it is therefore bound by its 
provisions.  Like Article 22 of the ICCPR and Article 23(4) of the Universal 
Declaration declare that “[E]veryone shall have the right to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests.”216  Although both the UDHR and the ICCPR do not expressly refer to the 
right to strike, a positive inference may be drawn since they protect related rights, 
such as peaceful assembly, protected under Article 21 and of course Article 22 
quoted above.  Of particular importance is Article 22(2) which stresses that no 
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right “other than those which are 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society” and allow “lawful 
restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this 
right”. 
 
5.2.1.3 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS (ICESCR) 
The ICESCR is a multilateral treaty adopted by the UN’s General Assembly on 16 
December 1966 and came to force in 1976.  It has its roots in the same process that 
led to the UDHR.  It obliges its parties to work toward the granting of social, 
economic and cultural rights, including Article 8 which protects labour rights.  Article 
                                                          
216  Article22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171. 
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8(1)(d) guarantees the states’ parties “the right to strike, provided that it is exercised 
in conformity with the laws of the particular country”.217  In the South African context, 
therefore, the right to strike has to comply with the provisions of sections 64 and 65 
of the LRA.  The ICESCR recognizes the imposition by a court of lawful limitations on 
the right to strike.  It allows these rights to be limited for members of the armed 
forces, police, or government administrators.  As a consequence, any exercise of this 
right outside the framework of the LRA will be in violation of not only the LRA but also 
Article 8 of the ICESCR. 
 
5.3 EUROPEAN REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS PROVIDING AN EXPRESS RIGHT 
TO STRIKE 
The European Council has adopted several legal instruments that directly or 
indirectly regulate the right to strike.  The most important legal instrument adopted by 
the Council of Europe, which expressly  makes provisions for the protection of the 
right to strike, can be found in three of the main European Instruments.  The 
instruments include: The European Social Charter (1961), revised in (1996), The 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (1989) and The 
American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, 1969). 
 
5.3.1  THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER (1961) REVISED IN (1996) 
The European Social Charter was passed in 1961 and subsequently revised in 1996. 
It is one of the most prominent Charters, because it takes an approach similar to that 
of the ILO’s standards.  Article 6(4) of this Charter contains the first express 
authorization in an international instrument of the right to strike.  The Charter section 
that regulates the right of collective bargaining explicitly states that: 
 
“workers and employers have the right to collective action in cases of conflicts 
of interest, including the right to strike in accordance with the obligations that 
may arise from the collective agreement the parties have previously entered 
into.” 
 
                                                          
217  Ratification information sourced from Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, 8 
February, 2002. Online, Available: http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.  For discussion of Article 
8 see Fenwick, Minimum Obligations with Respect to Article 8 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in Chapman and Russell, (Eds.) Core Obligations: 
Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Intersentia, Antwerp (2002) 53.  
 70 
Heppele observes, however, that despite this express provision, the Charter has 
been “little known, rarely referred to and often ignored in practice”.218 
 
Notably, the UK ratified the Charter on 11 July 1962 and has accepted 60 out of 72 
provisions, including Article 6(4).219 
 
5.3.2 THE COMMUNITY CHARTER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS 
OF WORKERS (1989) 
This is another important piece of European instrument to expressly provide for the 
right to strike.220  Of importance to the right to strike are Articles 13 and 14 of this 
Charter.  Article 13 regulates the right to organize collective action in cases of 
conflicts of interests. It provides that  
 
“The right to resort to collective action in the event of a conflict of interests shall 
include the right to strike, subject to the obligations arising under national 
regulations and collective agreements.”  
 
Article 14 permits the State Party to determine under which conditions and to what 
extent it will apply  the right to strike in the armed forces, police and civil service. 
 
Notably the Charter was not incorporated into Community Law as a binding 
instrument.  However, it has been invoked by the European Court of Justice as an 
interpretative tool.221 
 
Both the Community Charter 1989 and the European Social Charter 1961 subject the 
right to strike to national regulations and collective agreements.  Such requirement 
                                                          
218  Hepple “25 years of the European Social Charter” 1989 10 Comparative Labour Law Journal  
460.  
219  The United Kingdom and the European Social Charter, Table of Accepted provisions (June 
2010),http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/countryfactsheets/UK_en.pdf Article 
6(4) provides that the Contracting Parties undertake to consider themselves bound by the 
obligations laid down in the following articles and paragraphs and also the right of workers and 
employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, including the right to strike, 
subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into. The 
European Social Charter of 18 October 1961 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/ 
Html/035.htm. 
220  Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 9 December 1989. 
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/community-charter--en.pdf. 
221  Barnard Employment Law (2006) 13. 
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would reduce the influence of these European instruments on certain Member 
States, for instance the United Kingdom.  
 
5.3.3  THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(2000), REVISED IN (2007) 
The other European legal instrument to expressly provide for the right to strike is the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in 2000 and revised 
in 2007. 
 
Article 28 states that: 
 
“Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance 
with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of 
conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including 
strike action.” 
 
This Charter also emphasizes that the primary purpose of a strike should be to put 
pressure on the employer in the course of negotiations of employment matters.222 
 
The European Courts of Human Rights (ECtHR) have also been in the forefront in 
trying to lead the evolution and protection of the employees’ right to strike.  In 
UNISON v UK,223 the ECtHR stated that “the ability to strike represents one of the 
most important means by which trade unions can fulfil the function of protecting the 
occupational interests of their members”.  
 
Similarly, in Wilson and Palmer v the United Kingdom,224 the issue was discrimination 
against trade union members who refused to surrender trade-union representation.  
The ECtHR was even clearer since it stated that the essence of a voluntary system 
of collective bargaining is that it must be possible for a trade union which is not 
recognised by an employer to take steps, including if necessary, industrial action, 
with a view to persuading the employer to enter into collective bargaining with it on 
those issues which the union believes are important for its members’ interests. 
                                                          
222  Ibid. 
223  (2002) ECHR 2002-VI 301, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 320. 
224  Wilson and Palmer v The United Kingdom (2002) par 46. Applications nos. 30668/96, 30671/96 
and 30678/96.  
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In the leading case of Metrobus v Unite the Union case,225 the UK Court of Appeal, 
the court acknowledged that Article 11 did not recognise expressly either a right to 
collective bargaining or a right to strike.  However, the court emphasised that a 
balance needs to be struck between the rights and interests of workers and their 
trade unions.  An objective test needs also be applied in order to determine whether 
the limitations on the right to strike go too far because of their complexity, detail and 
rigidity, which in return deny the exercise of Article 11 rights.  
 
In Demir v Turkey,226 the case concerned an annulment of a collective agreement. In 
holding unanimously that there had been a breach of Article 11, the Grand Chamber 
expressly repudiated the jurisprudence of the 1970s, emphasising that “the 
Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions, and in accordance with developments in international law, so as to reflect 
the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human 
rights”.227 
 
The ECtHR ruled in favour of the union and held that at both international and 
national levels the practice of contracting states in such matters, the right to bargain 
collectively with the employer has, in principle, become one of the essential elements 
of the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of one's interests.  For 
the trade union it is an essential means to promote and secure the interests of its 
members.  The annulment of the collective agreement in question constituted 
interference with the applicants' rights under Article 11.  
 
A year later in Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey228 the case related to a circular from the 
Prime Minister's Public-Service prohibiting public-sector employees from taking part 
in a national one-day strike organised by the Federation of Public Sector Trade 
Unions “to secure the right to a collective bargaining agreement”.  For the first time, 
                                                          
225  [2009] IRLR 851, CA. See also  Ruth Dukes “the right to strike under UK law: Not much more 
than a slogan?” 2010 39 ILJ 82.  
226  [2009] IRLR 766 ECtHR . 
227  [2009] IRLR 766 ECtHR par 146. 
228  Application No 68959/01, judgment dated 21 April 2009 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-
 press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-2712212-2963054#{"itemid":["003-2712212-2963054"]} 
(Accessed 8-10-2014). 
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the court recognised that Article 11 protects the right to strike and that State 
interference with that right must be justified in accordance with Article 11(2).  The 
court stated that the right to strike was not “absolute” and could be subject to 
“restrictions”.  However, the court found that the adoption and application of the 
circular did not answer a “pressing social need” and that there had been 
disproportionate interference with the applicant union’s right to strike. 
 
More recently the trilogy on strike law in Europe came to the court in Karacay v 
Turkey,229 Kaya and Seyhan v Turkey230 and Çerikçiv Turkey.231  In these cases, 
public servants each participated in days of strike action called by their union.  Each 
was subjected to a disciplinary inquiry and subsequently disciplined for leaving their 
workplaces without authority.  Each was given a written warning “to be more attentive 
to the accomplishment of his/her functions and in his/her behaviour”.  The court 
found that this constituted a breach of their right of freedom of association under 
Article 11(1), emphasising once again that a restriction on the right to strike will 
infringe Article11(1).  This in itself is a remarkable conclusion with wide implications, 
given the subject matter of the strikes, which does not appear to have been directly 
related to collective bargaining. 
 
5.3.4 THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (PACT OF SAN 
JOSÉ, 1969) 
In America, Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides for 
freedom of association.  The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San 
José, 1988) develops this freedom of association in Article 8, which closely 
resembles the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.  It contains one provision not found in any of the other standards 
examined here, affirming that no one may be compelled to belong to a trade union.  
This makes trade-union security clauses or practices contrary to the Protocol.  
 
  
                                                          
229  Application 6615/03, 27 March 2007, definitive version of the judgment on 27 June 2007 148. 
230  Application 30946/04, 15 September 2009 149. 
231  Application33322/07, 13 October 2010 153. 
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5.4  THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (1981) 
In the African context, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) 
contains no provision directly on freedom of association for employers or workers. 
Nevertheless, it does contain significant provisions in Article 10 and 11.  They 
respectively provide a general assertion for the protection of the right to free 
association provided that employers and workers abide by the law and the right to 
freedom of assembly. 
 
After examining the express right to strike in European and international instruments, 
the next sub-section will focus on the Protection of employees’ right to strike under 
the international labour law. 
 
5.5 THE ABOLITION OF FORCED LABOUR CONVENTION 1957 
It is suggested that the freedom from forced labour should also be accepted as one 
of the grounds for international and European protection of a right to strike.  Since 
1945, forced labour has come to be seen a means of political and social coercion 
and has fallen within the protection of human rights.232 
 
Particularly, Article 1 of this Convention states that forced or compulsory labour 
should be suppressed as: 
 
a) a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or 
expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established 
political, social or economic system;  
 
b) a method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic 
development;  
 
c) a means of labour discipline;  
 
d) a punishment for having participated in strikes; and 
                                                          
232  Lammy Betten, International Labour Law, Selected Issues (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, The Netherlands 1993). http://vufind.carli.illinois.edu/vf-uiu/Record/uiu_3545085 
(Accessed 12-10-2014). 
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e) a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.  
 
As regards the protection of the right to strike, no criminal sanction is imposed 
anymore for the failure to perform an employment contract.  However, injunctions 
against trade unions restraining from calling for strikes or dismissal of participants 
might be construed as compulsion to work.233 
 
In such extent, the right to strike can be linked to the fundamental freedom from 
forced labour and requires International and European protection.  
 
5.6 PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO STRIKE UNDER THE 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 
The basis of international labour law is the International Labour Conventions adopted 
by the ILO.  
 
However, the lack of an express mention of the right to strike in the ILO Conventions 
has resulted in major inconsistency in the interpretation application of this right by 
member States.  This is probably due to this absence which has led to a number of 
members not implementing this right properly and adequately and giving effect or 
protection to this right.234  Perhaps, due to this absence, member States have sought 
to unduly over limit this right to the extent that it has become practically inaccessible 
and not exercisable.  Therefore, the ILO’s supervisory bodies have had to deal with 
this question more often than any other subject in labour relations, and it is by means 
of this supervisory process that the ILO’s principles have developed.  
 
The CFA recognises strikes for the purposes of promoting and defending the 
interests of workers.  This Committee has emphasised that the conditions that have 
to be fulfilled under the law in order to render a strike protected should be reasonable 
and in any event not such as to place a substantial limitation on the means of action 
                                                          
233  Ben-Israel “International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike” (Deventer: Kluwer, 
1988) 25; Tonia Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (OUP, New 
York 2003) 69.  
234  http://column.global-labour-university.org/2014/04/the-right-to-strike.html.  
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open to trade-union organizations.235  The Committee has further acknowledged that 
the right to strike is one of the essential means through which workers and their 
organizations may promote and defend their economic and social interests.236  
 
The ILO, primarily Article 3 and 10 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise Convention237 and the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention238 are the two leading international instruments providing 
protection to the right to strike.  Both of these instruments were ratified by South 
Africa.239  In terms of these conventions, the general principle is that “the right to 
strike is an intrinsic corollary of the right of association protected”.240  For that reason 
strike action cannot be seen in isolation from industrial relations as a whole. In fact, in 
most countries strikes are recognised as a legitimate weapon of trade unions in 
furtherance of their members’ interests.241 
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Committee of Experts on the Application of the Conventions on Freedom of Association, the 
 77 
 
While neither of these conventions expressly provides for a positive right to strike, the 
jurisprudence developed by the Committee of Experts on the application of 
Conventions and Recommendations242 and the CFA recognizes the existence of the 
right to strike.243 
 
5.7  CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS FOR EXERCISING THE RIGHT TO 
STRIKE 
The supervisory bodies consider that the right to strike is not an absolute right.  It 
may be limited by law and under certain conditions.244  
 
 A general prohibition of collective action can only be justified in the event of an 
acute, in particular economic, national emergency and for a limited period of 
time.  
 
 The duty to prohibit a strike on the grounds of national security or public health 
should not lie with the Government, but with an independent body. 
 
 Demonstrations, go-slows, work-to-rule, overtime bans and other forms of 
primary strike action should be permitted. 
 
 Sympathy strikes should be permitted when the primary strike is lawful. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining and the Convention and Recommendation 
concerning rural workers organisations, Report III (Part 4B), International Labour Conference 
(1983) 69th Session 200 and 205. 
242  Hereinafter referred to as the CEACR. 
243   Creighton and Stewart Labour Law (2005) 533 and  Gernigon,  Odero and Guido, ILO Principles 
concerning the right to strike, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2000.The CFA was 
established in 1951. After a relatively slow beginning, the number of cases submitted to the 
CFA increased steadily for a number of years. Overall, the Committee has examined more than 
2400 alleged breaches of the principles of freedom of association. It has also established an 
elaborate jurisprudence, the key features of which are set out in the ILO’ Digest of decisions. It 
does not concern “case law” in the strict sense of the word: The examination of periodic reports 
on Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 also constitutes an important part of the work of the CEACR. 
For example, in 2007, the Committee addressed “observations” to 103 of the 147 States that 
had ratified Convention No. 87, plus direct requests to 55 States (including 30 that had also 
received an observation). 
244  ILO General Survey “Freedom of association and collective bargaining” 1994 par 164. 
Hereinafter referred to as the General Survey 1994 par 176. 
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 A minimum safety service may be imposed in all cases of strike action when 
such minimum service is intended to ensure the safety of persons, the 
prevention of accidents and the safety of machinery and equipment. 
 
 A minimum operational service may be established in the case of strikes in 
public-utility services and in public services of fundamental importance; 
employers’ and workers’ organisations and the public authorities should be 
able to participate in determining this minimum service. 
 
It is also noted that the right to strike should be exercised in line with other 
fundamental rights of other citizens and employers.245  As a consequence, any strike 
that fails to meet this prerequisite may be declared unprotected and may amount to 
unfair labour practice.  Parties involved in such strike incur civil-liability and 
disciplinary sanctions.246  
 
The ILO supervisory body has accepted that in most countries the law permits them 
to impose a series of preconditions to be met in order to render a strike protected. 
The preconditions must, however, be reasonable, and not substantially limit the 
means of action open to trade-union organisations.247 
 
The large number of Committee decisions on this issue may be attributed to the fact 
that some 15 per cent of the cases submitted to it concerns the exercise of the right 
to strike.248  Most recent cases before the ILO supervisory bodies relating to 
Canadian provinces concern the denial or restrictions of collective bargaining and of 
the corollary right to strike in the public sector and other services.249  
                                                          
245  Gernigon, Odero, and Guido “ILO principles concerning the righto strike” ILO Geneva (2000) 42. 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_ 
087987.pdf.  
246  General Survey 1994 par 176. 
247  ILO 1996d par 498. For instance, giving a prior written notice of strike to the employer before 
embarking on strike, the holding of a secret ballot, utilising the machinery of compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration if required. 
248  Gernigon, Odero & Guido “ILO principles concerning the righto strike” ILO Geneva (2000)43. 
249  Case no 2467 (Canada/Quebec), report no 344, ILO Official Bulletin, vol. XC, 2007, Series B, 
no1,461-587; cases no 2314 and no 2333 (Canada/Quebec), report no340 , ibid., vol. LXXXIX, 
2006, ,Series B, no1,373- 432; case no 2405 (Canada/British Columbia), report no340, 318- 
338 and report no 343 , ibid.,no3, 433-457; case no 2430 (Canada/Ontario), report no343,  339- 
363; case no 2324(Canada/British Columbia), report no 336, vol. LXXXVIII, 2005, Series B, 
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Also, certain procedural and substantive requirements set by the CFA and accepted 
under the ILO must be met prior to strike.250  These include: 
 
 The obligation to give the employer a prior written notice;251  
 
 the obligation to have recourse to conciliation, mediation and (voluntary) 
arbitration procedures in industrial disputes as a prior condition to declaring a 
strike, provided that the proceedings are adequate, impartial and speedy and 
that the parties concerned can take part at every stage;252 
 
 the obligation to observe a certain quorum and to obtain the agreement of a 
specified majority;253  
 
 the obligation to take strike decisions by secret ballot;254  
 
 the adoption of measures to comply with safety requirements and for the 
prevention of accidents;255  
 
 the establishment of a minimum service in particular cases;256 and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
no1, 233- 284; case no 2277(Canada/Alberta), report no 333, vol. LXXXVII, 2004, Series B, 
no1, 240- 277; report no 337, no2, vol.LXXXVIII, 2005, Series B, no2, 343- 360; case no 2349 
(Canada/ New Foundland and Labrador), report no337, 361- 407; cases no 2343, no 2401, 
no2403 (Canada/Quebec), ) report no 338, ibid., no3, 536-603; case no2257, report no 335, vol. 
LXXXVII, 2004, Series B, no3, 412- 470; case no 2305 (Canada/Ontario), report no 335, 471- 
512. See Langille, "Can We Rely on the ILO?" Canadian Journal of Labour and Employment 
Law, 2007, vol. no 13; Etherington “The B.C. Health Services and Support-Decision – The 
Constitutionalization of a Right to bargain collectively in Canada: where did it come from and 
where it lead?” Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 2009 30(4) 740 741. 
250  International Labour Office, Labour legislation guidelines, Chapter 5: Substantive provisions of 
labour legislation the right to strike. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/llg/ 
index.htm (Accessed 9 August 2014). See also Gernigon, Odero and Guido, ILO Principles 
concerning the right to strike, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2000 21 and also Romeyn 
“The Need for Further Reform of the Law Relating to Industrial Action: striking a balance: the 
need for further reform of the law relating to industrial action” Research Paper no. 33 2007–08 
25 June 2008 (Accessed on 27 August 2014). 
251  ILO, 1996d par 502 504.  
252  ILO, 1996d par 500 and 501. 
253  ILO, 1996d par 506-513. 
254  ILO, 1996d par 503 and 510. 
255  ILO, 1996d par 554 and 555. 
256  ILO, 1996d par 556-558. 
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 the guarantee of the freedom to work for non-strikers.257 
 
As it was noted in Chapter 2, before 1994, strikes that were not in compliance with 
the requirement in the 1956 Act were declared illegal and as such, invited criminal 
sanctions.  Now, with our constitutional dispensation, the right to strike is fully 
guaranteed to all employees in section 23 of the Constitution.  However, employees 
who wish to embark on strike must comply with both procedural and substantive 
requirements as provided for under section 64 of the LRA that the strike must be 
considered protected.  Failing which, the unprotected strike can lead to disciplinary 
hearings and ultimately to dismissal. 
 
5.8  THE POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The LRA, besides giving effect to the constitutional right to strike, imposes certain 
limitations prior to embarking on strike action.  These limitations are set out in 
sections 64 and 65 of the LRA. 
 
Generally section 64 of the LRA provides that the strike will only be protected if: 
 
 the issue in dispute has been referred to a bargaining council or the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA); 
 
 a certificate stating that the dispute has been unresolved is issued or a period 
of 30 days has elapsed since the CCMA has received the referral of the 
dispute; and 
 
 the employer has been given 48 hours’ notice of the strike. 
 
Section 65 of the LRA prohibits strike on six grounds.  These includes, if: 
 
 the person is bound by collective agreement that prohibits a strike in respect 
of the issue in dispute; 
                                                          
257  ILO, 1996d par 586. 
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 an agreement requires the issue in dispute to be subjected to compulsory 
arbitration; 
 
 the issue in dispute is one that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or to 
the Labour Court in terms of the Act, for example dismissal for misconduct, 
unfair discrimination and retrenchment; 
 
 that person is engaged in an essential service, or a maintenance service; 
 
 there is an arbitration award, a collective agreement that regulates the issue in 
dispute or any determination made by the Minister that regulates the issue in 
dispute; and 
 
 there is any determination made in terms of the Wage Act which regulates the 
issue in dispute during the first year of that determination. 
 
5.9 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has noted that the right to strike forms an integral part of collective 
bargaining.  Despite the lack of an express provision affording protection to this right 
under the ILO, it plays a vital role in the employer-employee relationship.  
 
The chapter has also pointed out that most of the international instruments and 
regional conventions expressly protect the employees’ right to strike.  Importantly, the 
majority of the member states provide for the protection of the right to strike in their 
national legislation.  Furthermore, the ILO’s supervisory body has accepted that in 
most countries, the law permits them to impose a series of preconditions to be met in 
order to render a protected strike.  South Africa is a good example as it provides for 
the protection of this right in the Constitution and the LRA gave effect to this right.  
 
Perhaps, what has been at the core of many disputes in many member states is the 
limitation placed prior to the exercise of this right.  The ILO suggests that the 
limitations should not be unduly and unreasonably limited.  The rationale being that it 
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is a weapon used by the employees to force the employer to accede to their demand. 
Arguably, there are two reasons why it is important for the LRA to follow the same 
principles.  Firstly, South Africa is a member State of the ILO.  Secondly, section 1 of 
the LRA sets the primary objects of the LRA, and that is the peremptory requirement 
to consider international law.   
 
The recent increase of the limitations on the right to strike has come to the spotlight 
in the past months.  It is debatable, whether the current South African labour-
legislative framework offers a sound environment for employees to exercise their 
constitutional right to strike need to be measured and evaluated again against the 
ILO’s jurisprudence.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Following the transition to the new political dispensation and the dawn of democracy 
in South Africa several remarkable legislations were enacted.  Key amongst them 
was the Constitution which recognises the right to strike as an important bargaining 
tool for trade unions.  The LRA which gives effect to the Constitution and to the 
numerous obligations acquired by South Africa by virtue of its membership of the ILO 
also protects this right.  The constitutionalisation of the right to strike was a major 
achievement for labour movement.  More importantly, it contains a set of limitations 
to the right to strike.  This marked a shift from the old labour-relations dispensation 
where the right was heavily limited with employees enjoying limited protection for 
participating in strike actions. 
 
Arguably the current LRA depicts one of the remarkable legal transformations in the 
post-apartheid South Africa.  It is structured in a way which brings about a 
wholesome change in South Africa’s statutory industrial-labour system.  These in turn 
help to level the playing field by empowering employees with numerous rights, 
including the right to strike. 
 
This treatise has examined and shed some light on whether increasing the current 
limitations on the employees’ right to strike is constitutionally and internationally 
justified in terms of the ILO.  Throughout, this study has observed and suggested 
that, instead of increasing the limitation on the right to strike, the development of a 
proper and effective collective-bargaining structure needs to be established.  It is 
clear that some similarities with the ILO and also disparities have become evident. 
 
A key question posed in this treatise is whether increasing the limitation on the 
employees’ right to strike protected by the Constitution and the LRA read with the 
Amendments in the Bill, creates an unnecessary hurdle to the employees wishing to 
strike.  
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In order to unlock this question, the procedural requirements, particularly those of 
strike-notice requirement has been discussed.  The study has observed that the LRA 
requires only employees to issue a 48 hours’ written strike notice be given to the 
employer prior to strike or 7 days’ notice in case of the State as the employer.  The 
LRA is silent on the content required in the notice.  There have been notable 
developments through court judgments that have increasingly sought to limit this 
constitutional right even further.  This has been so particularly through the increase of 
the content in a strike notice before employees may embark on a strike.  Arguably, 
this severely limits employees from exercising their constitutional right to strike. 
 
Currently, section 65(1)(c) of the LRA holds that no person may take part in a strike 
or a lock-out if the issue in dispute is one that a party may have referred to arbitration 
or to the Labour Court in terms of the LRA. 
 
The proposed amendment to section 65(1)(c) seeks to further limit the right to strike 
or lock-out by excluding this right in circumstances where the issue in dispute is one 
that could be referred to arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms of the LRA, or in 
terms of any other employment law. 
 
It is clear from court judgments that the challenge, controversy and uncertainty of the 
courts to maintain a balance between the constitutional right to strike and the 
limitations provided for in the Act continue.  
 
As Maserumule points out that the courts and the Act itself have failed to protect the 
right to strike that is guaranteed by the Constitution.258  
 
“… the labour courts have failed to protect the right to strike guaranteed by s 23 
of the Constitution. It will further be argued that they have, instead, been 
preoccupied with giving effect to the limitations of that right, as reflected in 
chapter IV of the Act, and, in particular, the provisions of ss 64-66 and 77. The 
result has been that the jurisprudence that has developed around strike law is 
not on how to give effect to the right to strike but how to give effect to the 
limitation of that right that is prescribed by the LRA.” 
 
                                                          
258  Maserumule “A perspective on developments in strike law” (2001) 22 ILJ 45 at 46. 
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The right to strike forms an integral part of collective bargaining. It is an effective and 
powerful bargaining tool for employees to back up their demands.  International, 
regional, and national laws of most countries offer protection to this right.  In the 
South African context, the importance of this right is illustrated by the fact that section 
23(2)(c) of the Constitution expressly provides every employee with the right to strike.  
 
However, like any other right in the Bill of Rights, the right to strike is not absolute.  It 
is limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution which is a general limitation clause 
for all rights in the Bill of Rights.  It is also limited in terms sections 64 and 65 of the 
LRA.  As pointed out earlier, section 64 of the LRA contains the procedural 
requirements for a strike, which employees should follow in order for a strike action to 
be protected.  If the requirements are complied with, the strike will be protected 
against the legal consequences.  However, this protection may be waived and 
employees dismissed if they engage in violent acts of misconduct, e.g. assault, 
intimidation and damage to property.  Participation of unprotected strike constitutes 
misconduct and the employer will have a remedy for compensation for loss suffered 
or may apply for an interdict.  The employer may even dismiss the employee as long 
as both substantive and procedural requirements are complied with. 
 
On the international front, the protection of the right to strike is guaranteed under the 
objectives of the ILO with the view to pursuing social justice for all.  The study has 
noted that most international and regional conventions raise this right to the pedestal 
of universal human rights.  South Africa is a member of the ILO and therefore such it 
must comply with its obligation in line with the ILO.  Section 39 of our Constitution in 
fact contains a peremptory provision that obliges courts, tribunals or forums when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, to consider international law.  Equally, section 3 of the 
LRA sets out the primary objects of the LRA, and key amongst them is the 
peremptory requirement to consider international law.  In addition case law (Bader 
Bop case) has made it clear for the Labour Court judges and arbitrators to review 
their interpretation of the Act in regard to constitutionally guaranteed rights, including 
the right to strike.  This decision will cause judges to deviate from interpreting the Act 
narrowly when dealing with strike law without considering the Constitution and 
International Conventions of the ILO. 
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Although this right is not expressly provided for by the ILO Conventions, the 
jurisprudence developed by the ICEACR and the CFA recognises the existence of 
the right to strike.  Two Conventions which are of particular importance to South 
Africa are the Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention 35 (1948) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention (1949). 
 
The supervisory bodies consider that the right to strike is not an absolute right.  It can 
be exercised only under certain conditions.  However, a general prohibition of this 
right is normally not acceptable.  It may be justified in a situation of acute national 
crisis, but only for a limited period and to the extent necessary to meet the 
requirements of the situation. 
 
But above all the ILO position remains that this right should not be unduly and 
unreasonably limited.  The rationale being that it is almost the only weapon used by 
the employees to force their employer to accede to their demand.  Importantly, is also 
because the ILO views this right as an intrinsic corollary to article 3(1) of Convention 
No 87, which accepts the right of the trade union and employer‘s organisation to 
organise activities and to formulate programmes. 
 
For the right to strike to be well structured, the need to be a realisation that it is not a 
goal to be achieved at once but rather that various structures need to be put into 
place to facilitate the progressive protection of this right.  This would go a long way in 
providing the employer-employee relationship, resulting in a stable working 
environment. 
 
A key factor which perhaps needs to be considered and which may go an extra mile 
in improving laws regulating the right to strike is the modernization of the current 
labour law to comply with the changing needs of employees at work.  Most important 
could be the establishment of a Code of Good Practice negotiated by labour and 
business at NEDLAC, which will highlight guidelines that must be followed when 
disputes relating to strikes arise, could be ideal.  The government should also play an 
active role in creating a more stable collective-bargaining structure. 
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Strikes are indeed ill winds which blow neither the employers nor employees any 
good.  Recently, South Africa has been confronted with a high level of violent strikes.  
This impacts negatively on the image of the country internationally, and also affects 
its economy as investors may be hesitant to do business in the country.  Fortunately 
South Africa has one of the most progressive labour-legislation regimes in the world 
which makes dispute-resolution processes available to parties. 
 
Clearly legislation in South Africa strengthens collective bargaining.  This study 
suggests that perhaps to achieve industrial peace in South Africa employers should 
promptly review, negotiate and implement collective agreements entered with 
workers concerning improvements in wages and general working conditions.  More 
importantly, employers must accept and respect the fact that collective bargaining is 
the only viable and practical means of ensuring labour peace in the workplace.  
Employees and their trade unions must use these processes instead of resorting to 
violence.  Lawlessness should not be allowed to infiltrate and pollute the right to 
strike.  Otherwise we shall continue to exercise fears over the continuous threats of 
strikes, and strike in the industrial sector because workers will continue to use strike 
as a weapon of last resort in collective bargaining. 
 
Whether this is the point of view that will eventually prevail or whether the SCA or 
even the Constitutional Court will also be called upon to decide on this issue, remains 
to be seen.  What is clear, however, is that there is still scope for considerable 
controversy on this point.  
 
Trade unions have also failed in their mandate to employee.  This could perhaps be 
due to how they are run and managed like political parties.  They have failed, not 
only in upholding the principles of responsible trade unionism but also in educating 
their members about their rights and obligations in terms of the constitution, the LRA 
and the ILO regarding the right to strike.  This is typified by what happened in the 
Marikana tragedy.  
 
Perhaps impliedly, it seems it has now become acceptable in South Africa that strike 
action has become part of the dispute-resolution mechanism since labour-related 
issues cannot be addressed without strike action.  This is indeed a dangerous 
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situation.  Business and other social partners should negotiate this unprecedented 
development at NEDLAC.  
 
As Brad correctly suggests, social parties need to be trained in modern good-faith 
negotiation and risk-analysis skills.  With regard to collective bargaining, structures 
need to be well financed and be given sufficient and reliable economic information. 
 
The law also needs to be developed regarding the consequences and liabilities of 
trade unions which fail to uphold the mandate.  Two key issues can be inferred, not 
only from the Marikana tragedy, but also strikes in South Africa in general.  It seems 
that some trade unions do not perform their duties correctly to ensure peaceful 
strikes in compliance with the LRA.  Trade unions should therefore take responsibility 
to ensure that their members conduct themselves properly during strikes, whether 
protected or not. 
 
Secondly, they may be knowledgeable of the law but deliberately choose to ignore 
the last-mentioned or lack the relevant knowledge, in which case training becomes 
vital.  
 
Trade-union representatives should be well trained, particularly on issues relating to 
procedural requirements prior to a strike in terms of the LRA.  Disregard by the shop 
stewards to liaise with the employees on these procedural issues should make them 
personally liable, or at least the trade union he represents should be held 
accountable if employees go on an unprotected strike. 
 
Finally, in closure, the right to strike is an important tool for employees during 
collective bargaining and as such should not be over-limited. 
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